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This dissertation studies how to characterize strategic behaviors in elec-
tricity markets from a transmission-constrained residual demand perspective.
This dissertation generalizes the residual demand concept, widely used by
economists in general markets, to electricity markets, which are constrained
by transmission networks. The transmission-constrained residual demand is
characterized by a sensitivity analysis of the optimal power flow program,
which is the electricity market clearing engine. Methods are proposed to op-
timize a generator or generation firm’s profit utilizing the residual demand
sensitivity information, which has several advantages over existing methods.
The transmission-constrained residual demand concept and the methods are
helpful for market participants to develop bidding strategies and for market
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Restructuring has been a worldwide trend in the electric power industry
in the last two decades. Starting in Chile and UK in the 1980s, electric industry
restructuring has built electricity markets almost all over the world [39]. For
example, there are electricity markets in:1
• Europe: United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Nordic countries (Denmark,
Finland, Norway and Sweden)
• North America: ISO-NE (New England), PJM (originally Pennsylva-
nia, New Jersey and Maryland, since expanded to other states), CAISO
(California), ERCOT (Texas), Midwest ISO, Alberta (Canada)
• South America: Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia
• Asia: Japan
In this chapter, we will briefly go over the backgrounds of this significant
restructuring in the electric power industry, introduce key elements in major
electricity markets in the US, and review electricity market analysis methods.
1This is not a comprehensive list of the electricity markets in the world.
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1.1 Electric Power Industry Restructuring: From Util-
ities to Electricity Markets
The content of this section mainly comes from [41]. Historically, the
power system is managed by a traditional vertically integrated utility, which
is in charge of electricity generation, transmission and distribution. Utilities
were understood to be natural monopolies due to economies of scale, and must
be regulated since monopolies generally do not have incentives to increase
efficiency, reduce costs, or improve quality of service [41].
On the other hand, new developments in transmission technology en-
able power to be efficiently transfered over long distances. This means gener-
ators located at different physical locations, far or near from the load, could
possibly compete to serve the load. In addition, more standardized reliability
criteria are imposed to regulate utilities’ operation. This also makes electricity
more of a standardized product so that it can be priced through competitive
markets instead of regulation.
All these new developments in technology and regulation eventually
help to introduce competition in generation, because competitive markets can
potentially increase efficiency, reduce costs, and improve quality of service [41].
Electric industry restructuring started with separating out generation
from the traditional utilities, and introducing wholesale competition. Reg-
ulated utilities still own the transmission and distribution networks, but the
transmission networks are operated by an Independent System Operator (ISO),
which is under regulation to provide “open access” to all market participants.
2
Newly developed electricity markets have included more ingredients than gen-
eration competition, but generation competition is still the core of all electric-
ity market design.
With more than two decades of experiences up to now, both successful
and frustrating, there is a consensus that economic theories and engineering
laws should be integrated into electricity market design, and a successful elec-
tricity market should achieve a good balance between economy and engineering
characteristics.
An electricity market cannot operate independently of the power sys-
tem. The quality of electricity energy, mainly in terms of reliability, is deter-
mined by the power system standards. Without the power system standards
for electricity reliability, electricity energy would not even be considered as a
commodity. The power system is the basis the electricity market is built upon.
The established ways power engineers maintain system reliability greatly af-
fect electricity market design. In this sense, an electricity market has the dual
nature of being a market, and being an engineering system. In other words, it
is a market operated within engineering boundaries. For example, if transmis-
sion capacity is not enough to accommodate the most economic generators to
compete at certain locations in the system, electricity markets will work out
a less economic way to serve the load within the transmission limitations.
Generally speaking, the relative importance of the two characteristics
depend on the time frame. The closer to real time system operation, the more
important the engineering nature; the longer time frame, the more prominent
3
the market nature. This is because close-to-real-time engineering boundaries
must be strictly respected in order to avoid compromising power system reli-
ability, while long-term power transactions are viewed more as market behav-
iors, and rely less on engineering practices.
1.2 Typical electricity market elements
Although the objectives for restructuring the electric power industry
are similar, that are to increase efficiency, reduce costs, and improve quality
of service [41], the restructuring has differed a lot in scope and details in their
early stage. Nowadays, with more and more experiences accumulated, the
various electricity market designs eventually show a trend toward uniformity.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) even promoted a “Stan-
dard Market Design” (SMD) for electricity markets in North America based
on economic theories, engineering laws, and experiences, to offer a streamlined
best practice. After that, electricity markets in the US have tended to be de-
signed to be compatible with SMD. For example, the CAISO nodal market,
and the proposed ERCOT nodal market are both compatible with SMD, and
thus they share a lot of similarities in design.
In this dissertation, we will consider the common design elements of the
major power markets in the US, referring to them collectively as a “typical”
market compatible with FERC’s SMD. All the studies covered in the disserta-
tion focus on a typical market, so the results could be applicable and useful for
most of the existing electricity markets directly or with minor modifications.
4
Element Time Frame centralized
bilateral contract years to weeks prior no
congestion revenue right a year to a month prior partially yes
day-ahead market a day prior yes
real-time market an hour to 10 minutes prior yes
Table 1.1: Typical electricity market elements
This chapter briefly introduces the some of the most important typical
electricity market elements that are energy related. There are other key ele-
ments in electricity markets, such as ancillary services, which are not directly
related to energy, and they will not be covered here.
We will start the introduction with sorting the key electricity market
elements in chronological order as listed in Tab. 1.1 from top to bottom. A
market participant can arrange transactions going through each element from
top to bottom, and finally the electric energy is physically sold to or purchased
from the electric power grid depending on it is a generator or load.
First, we introduce the day-ahead market and real-time market, be-
cause they are where the major restructuring took place, and are also the
most important subjects of this study.
The real-time market is an offer based centralized auction market op-
erated by the ISO. As its name suggests, it operates very close to the physical
trade time, typically one hour to 10 minutes prior. Generators can submit
offers into the real-time market. A generator offer is a price function of quan-
tity specifying at each output level what is the minimal acceptable price. A
5
typical generator offer is illustrated in Fig. 1.1. The ISO uses the offers as
inputs to an optimal power flow (OPF) program clear the market. The OPF
is an optimization problem minimizing total generation cost to meet the load
forecast in the trade interval, subject to transmission constraints. The trade
interval is typically 5-minute to 15-minute granularity. The cleared offers will
get a Locational Marginal Price (LMP) that is the incremental cost to serve
one extra unit of load at the same location. The detailed formulation and
pricing mechanism will be covered in detail in chapter 3 and 4. The offers
cleared in the real-time market are financially binding.
The day-ahead market is similar to the real-time market, except that it
is a forward market that clears typically a day before the trade day. Not only
generators but also loads can bid into the day-ahead market. A typical demand
bid is also illustrated in Fig. 1.1. The day-ahead market clearing mechanism
is very similar to the real-time market except that instead of meeting the load
forecast, the ISO tries to clear as much as possible balanced generation and
demand based on the their offers and bids. From optimization point of view,
it is simply treating the demand bids as negative generation offers, and setting
the load forecast at zero. Because day-ahead market and real-time market
share the same clearing engine, the OPF, the studies in this dissertation will
be applicable to both of them. The offers and bids that are cleared in the
day-ahead market are also financially binding.
The real-time market can be viewed as a fine tuning market for the day-
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Figure 1.1: Offers and bids
changes to the day-ahead cleared offers. A generator cleared 100 MW in the
day-ahead at $30 /MWh, and an additional 10 MW in the real-time market
at $40 /MWh, will be paid 100 · 30 + 10 · 40 = 140 $/h. This is called the
two-settlement system.
In a longer time frame, market participants can sign bilateral contracts
with other participants several years before the physical delivery time. The
bilateral contracts represent the counterparties’ willingness to trade electric
energy, and they are purely individual decisions of the counterparties without
the ISO’s involvement. The bilateral contracts are more of a market nature,
but the transmission capabilities need to considered to avoid infeasible trans-
actions at physical delivery time. In other words, the transactions should
not overload lines or line groups under normal operation condition and cer-
tain contingency conditions. Otherwise, the transactions will be at the risk
of being curtailed to maintain power system security at delivery time. The
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bilateral contracts will also need to go through the day-ahead market and/or
real-time market to implicitly let the ISO know the transactions. It is implicit
because the ISO only knows the offers and bids of the counterparties, but does
not know there are the bilateral contracts between them when ISO clears the
market. From the ISO’s perspective, all bids are treated the same, and will
settled at the LMP. The counterparties need to do extra settlement outside
the day-ahead market and real-time market to fulfill the contract price. For
example, a generator and a load sign a contract of 100 MW at $30 price, and
the day-ahead market clears them at $40 each. In this case, the generator
receives $10 above the contract price, and needs to refund 10 · 100 = 1000 $/h
to the load. The load pays $40 /MWh to the ISO, and receives $10 /MWh
from the generator, so its net price is $30 /MWh, which is the contract price.
However, there will be a problem if the generator and load are not at
the same location, so they get different LMPs. For example, a generator and
a load sign a contract of 100 MW at $30 /MWh price, but due to transmission
congestion, the day-ahead market settles generator at $20 /MWh and the load
at $50 /MWh. The generator receives $10 /MWh less than the contract price,
and the load pays $20 /MWh more than the contract price. The counterparties
are short by (20 + 10) · 100 = 3000 $/h to be able to fulfill the contract price.
The amount is sometimes referred as congestion cost. The congestion revenue
right (CRR) is a financial instrument to hedge to congestion cost. Nowadays,
all electricity markets, both the existing ones and those under development in
the US, have CRRs built into the market design. For example, the proposed
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ERCOT nodal market will have two kinds of CRRs, namely point to point
rights to receive compensation according to LMP differences, and flowgate
rights (FGRs), which are path based rights to receive compensation according
to transmission shadow prices [17]. Take the point to point CRR as an exam-
ple, the ISO will pay the CRR owner the difference in LMP between the source
and sink times the CRR amount. If the counterparties own 100MW CRR with
the source at the generator location and the sink at the load location, the ISO
will pay them (50 − 20) · 100 = 3000 $/h, which is exactly the amount to
cover the congestion cost. In this case, the congestion cost is perfectly hedged
through CRR.
The ISO will auction CRR a month to a year prior to the trade day.
Only part of the capacities in the transmission network will be auctioned. The
rest of the capacities are either allocated to transmission owners as CRRs prior
to the CRR auction, or held as margins.
A generator or generation firm can sell electric energy through these
market elements in the following chronological order.
• Contact potential buyers to sign long-term bilateral contracts.
• Participate in CRR auction to procure CRR in order to hedge congestion
cost risk.
• Make offers into day-ahead market trying to fulfill the contracted amount,
and try to make more profit with the remaining capacity.
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• Fine tune offers in real-time market if it is more profitable.
• Deliver cleared schedule into the transmission grid.
1.3 Analyzing Strategic Behaviors in Electricity Mar-
kets via Residual Demand
The electricity market is a oligopoly market from the supply side. The
majority of total electric energy is supplied by a few big generation firms. Due
to this reason, they are strategic players in the market. The main topic of this
dissertation is to study how to analyze the strategic behaviors in centralized
offer-based day-ahead market and real-time market. In the rest of the dis-
sertation, unless stated otherwise, “electricity market” is specifically used to
refer to a day-ahead market or a real-time market. In other words, “electric-
ity market” is used through the rest of the dissertation to mean centralized
offer-based electricity energy market that is cleared by an OPF program, and
priced by LMP.
We assume the generators or generation firms pursue maximum profit
in electricity markets. Their strategic behaviors are characterized by or at
least bounded by the profit maximizing strategies. One major task of this
dissertation is to find the profit maximizing strategy. The approach we are
going to take is the residual demand approach, which has been widely used by
economists in general markets, as well as electricity markets without consider-
ing the transmission constraints. For example, [26] and [40] analyze the bid-
ding behaviors in ERCOT zonal balancing market using the residual demand
10
approach, [42] compares the Cournot model and supply function equilibrium
model for German electricity market using the residual demand approach, and
[5] optimizes a generators’ expected profit based on historical residual demand
curves.
Following Borenstein, Bushnell, and Stoft [11], let us consider a gen-
erator’s profit maximization problem from the residual demand point of view
in a transmission-constrained network. For simplicity, assume the generator
under consideration does not have any forward bilateral contracts or CRRs.
As discussed in [33], handling the contracts only involves shifting the offer
curve by the contracted amount. CRRs can be handled in a similar fashion as
handling the bilateral contracts.
Conceptually, each generator is facing a residual demand curve. The
residual demand curve specifies at each price level the maximum market share
left for the generator. Without transmission constraints, the residual demand
is defined by the total system demand minus the total supply for other gener-
ators. The residual demand for generator i is
Ri (p) = D (p)− S−i (p) (1.1)
where
• p is the market price,
• D (p) is the system total demand function, either price elastic or price
inelastic,
11





where Sj (p) is the supply from generator j.
For example, if at price $50/MWh, the system total demand is 1000 MW, and
the aggregated supply from other generators is 800 MW, then there is 200 MW
market share left for the generator, so the residual demand at $50/MWh is
200 MW. The price-demand pair (50, 200) is a point on the residual demand
curve.
From generator i’s point of view, the market clears at the point where
its supply meets its residual demand,
Si(pi) = Ri(pi). (1.2)
The generator i’s profit as a function of the output quantity is
Πi(qi) = Pi(qi)qi − Ci(qi), (1.3)
where Pi(qi) = R
−1
i (qi). That is, Pi(•) is the inverse function of Ri(•), so that
(Pi(qi), qi) is a point on the residual demand curve.
Although this discussion has been in terms of output quantity as the
strategic variable, the choice of the generator’s strategy decision variable is
not important. For example, the generator’s strategy can be: price, as in the
Bertrand model; quantity, as in the Cournot model; or a supply function, as in
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the supply function model.2 Without loss of generality, we choose the quantity
to be the generator’s strategic variable.
As illustrated in Fig. 1.2, at production qi, generator i’s profit Πi(qi) is
the shaded area between quantities 0 and qi, above the marginal cost function
C ′i (•) and below the price Pi(qi). Intuitively, the problem of maximizing profit
boils down to finding a point on the residual demand curve that maximizes
the shaded area.
We assume piecewise quadratic cost functions and piecewise linear offer
function such that the residual demand curve is piecewise linear, and the profit
function is piecewise quadratic. The first order necessary condition (FONC)
for maximizing generator i’s profit is
dΠi
dqi
(qi+) = Pi(qi) + P
′
i (qi)qi − C ′i(qi) ≤ 0,
dΠi
dqi





(qmaxi +) = 0,
dΠi
dqi
(qmini −) = 0,
where qmaxi and q
min
i are generator i’s output upper and lower limit respectively.
2Although the generator’s strategy decision variable is not important in calculating the
generator’s maximum profit, it may make a huge difference for a Nash Equilibrium model.
In other words, the Nash Equilibrium, if it exists, largely depends on the strategy space used
in the model as has been observed in many references, such as [6]. Empirically characterizing
the Nash Equilibrium of electricity markets is out of the scope of this dissertation. Latest
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Figure 1.2: Profit maximization given residual demand curve
The point on the residual demand curve satisfying (1.4) maximizes the
generator’s profit. The derivative of the residual demand is especially useful
because of its role in the FONC (1.4).
The transmission constraints in electricity markets are a challenge to
characterizing the residual demand. The uniqueness of electricity markets
comes largely from the transmission network [12]. The electric transmission
network that connects the suppliers and consumers for trading electricity has
to obey physical laws. In contrast to a transportation network, electricity
cannot flow across the electric transmission network arbitrarily. The electric
power flows are governed by Kirchoff’s Current Law (KCL) and Kirchoff’s
Voltage Law (KVL).
Some studies are based on over simplified representation of the trans-
mission network. For example, [11] considers only two nodes connected by
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a single line, and [43] models the transmission network as a transportation
network. These models are not able to capture the characteristics of a looped
electric transmission network. There are other studies circumventing the chal-
lenge of transmission constraints, and make conjectured assumptions on the
market price response or competitors’ responses to the strategic behaviors,
such as [15, 29]. Because these conjectured variation models are based on very
arbitrary assumptions, they cannot capture the characteristics of a looped
electric transmission network either. Yao and Oren propose an Equilibrium
Programming with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) model to calculate the
market Nash equilibrium in a transmission-constrained network [49]. They
assume the residual demand functions are explicitly given and do not change
as transmission congestion conditions change. In essence, it is the same as the
conjectured variation model.
There have been many numerical case studies that look into the impacts
of binding transmission constraints, such as [10, 12, 48]. For example, Cardell,
Hitt and Hogan use a Cournot model in a three-bus looped network, and
numerically demonstrate that strategic behaviors involving the transmission
constraints could lead to a market outcome that is different from the usual
analysis of imperfect competition [12]. Their work reinforces the need for
more rigorous characterization of the effect of the transmission constraints
on residual demand. Xu and Yu use a linear supply function model, and
calculate the transmission-constrained supply function equilibrium (SFE) [48].
They consider the impact of the transmission, and calculate the best response
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numerically. These studies have provide valuable insights, but they have not
characterized the effects of transmission constraints systematically, and are far
from practical applications.
To the other extreme, there exist many electricity market simulation
tools, which can model the market clearing process for production level sys-
tems. These tools are used in industry to support business decisions. Different
bidding strategies can be tested in simulations to find out the most profitable
ones. Because of simulation software limitations, this often involves tremen-
dous human judgment and intervention. It is true that these simulation tools
can assist in decision making, but they are black boxes incapable of providing
insights about how the market fundamentals drive the market outcomes. It is
a big challenge and of great importance for market participants and market
monitors to gain insights about how the transmission network acts as a main
driver for the market outcome, and to know how to leverage these insights.
A perfect method to study the strategic behaviors should combine the
power of two methods above:
• from the practical point of view, the method is able to handle large scale
production level systems, and it is better if the existing advanced market
simulation engines can be reused;
• from the theoretical point of view, the method is able to represent the
transmission networks to the same details as in the true market clearing
process, and systematically find the profit maximizing strategy.
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There is another type of method that aims at these two goals: the math-
ematical program with complementary constraints (MPEC) method, proposed
for application in electricity markets by Hobbs, Metzler, and Pang [23]. The
idea is to formulate a generator or generation firm’s profit maximization as a
two-level optimization problem, where the lower level is the OPF problem, and
the upper level is the generator’s own profit maximization problem. One way
to solve this problem is to add the KKT conditions for the OPF into the upper
level profit maximization as constraints, and form an integrated optimization
problem of MPEC [23]. As discussed in [23], the MPEC problem for generator




s.t. αi ≤ αi ≤ αi,
OPF KKT conditions,
(1.5)
where αi is generator i’s strategy variable vector, and αi and αi are its lower
bound and upper bound respectively. Note that the OPF KKT conditions is
nested in the generator’s MPEC problem (1.5).
A production level security constrained OPF problem typically mod-
els hundreds of generators, thousands of buses and lines, tens to hundreds
of contingencies [13], which makes the MPEC problem beyond the computa-
tional capability of existing MPEC solvers [30]. Moreover, although there exist
advanced algorithms and software to solve the OPF, which utilize the prop-
erty that only a few transmission constraints are likely to be simultaneously
binding, it is difficult to reuse them in solving the MPEC due to the nested
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structure. The MPEC approach essentially requires power system applica-
tion developers to start from scratch in order to implement such an algorithm.
Due to these reasons, there is rarely any implementation of the MPEC method
to calculate a generator’s optimal offer in practice. The MPEC method has
difficulty in meeting the first goal satisfactorily due to this limitation.
In summary, there is no available methods that could achieve the two
goals up to now. The major contributions of this dissertation are to propose
methods to meet the two goals. The method is based on the residual demand
concept. Through the rest of the dissertation we are going to:
• generalize the residual demand concept to transmission-constrained elec-
tricity markets, and




Characterizing Strategic Behaviors in
Electricity Markets Without Transmission
Constraints
Before dealing with the transmission constraints, we first review how
the residual demand can be used to characterize strategic behaviors and Nash
equilibrium in the absence of transmission constraints. The characterization
is based on the supply function Nash equilibrium (SFE) model, which is a
residual demand method in essence.
2.1 Introduction
As introduced in chapter 1, in typical restructured electricity markets,
market participants make offers into the market. The offer is a function speci-
fying the minimum acceptable prices for different output levels. Offer functions
may be fixed for an extended time horizon, and the market is cleared for ev-
ery market clearing interval in the time horizon. An example is a day-ahead
market, where the offers may be fixed for a day, and the market is cleared for
each hour of the day. Because the system demand changes over time during
the time horizon, the clearing price and quantities also change over time.
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Klemperer and Meyer introduced the supply function equilibrium (SFE)
model in [27]. It is a Nash equilibrium model to cope with demand uncertainty.
Following Green and Newbery [21], the SFE model fits the electricity market
setting if we:
1. define the supply function to be the inverse of the offer function,
2. represent the load-time profile in an electric power system as being equiv-
alent to load uncertainty in Klemperer and Meyer’s formulation, and
3. perform a Nash equilibrium model analysis for the oligopolistic electricity
market.
The SFE model treats the offer functions in electricity markets more realisti-
cally than other Nash equilibrium models such as the Cournot model and the
Bertrand model.1 Due to this advantage, the SFE model has been widely used
to study strategic behavior and market power in electricity markets. Green
and Newbery were among the first to use the SFE model in electricity market
analysis. They applied the SFE model to the electricity market in England and
Wales in [21] and [20]. Following them, SFE models gained more popularity
in electricity markets [1–4, 7–9, 18, 24, 25, 36, 40, 48].
1Von der Fehr and Harbord argued that the SFE model may not be appropriate for
piecewise constant offers. In this case, the offers have to be approximated by continuous
differentiable functions in order to apply the SFE model. The discussion in that direction
is outside the scope of this chapter.
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Klemperer & Meyer and Green & Newbery demonstrated that the SFE
can be characterized as a system of differential equations [21, 27]. The end-
point is specified by the price and quantity pair where the supply function
intersects the highest demand curve. As the end-point condition for the differ-
ential equations changes, the solutions trace out a continuum of equilibria [25].
The continuum of SFE will be illustrated in section 2.2, and the multiplicity
greatly reduces the predictive value of the SFE model. Various efforts have
been carried out in order to reduce the range of SFEs or to set up criteria to
select preferable or “focal” equilibria.
Klemperer and Meyer showed that if the support of realized prices is
infinite and there are no capacity constraints, then there is a unique SFE.
However, this is not a realistic assumption for electricity markets, because the
load is always finite [25]. We need to be able to deal with supply function
equilibria that have finite price and quantity support.
Green and Newbery chose the most profitable SFE in [21]. However,
the most profitable SFE yields predicted prices that are substantially above
actual prices [7], which greatly weakens the credibility of this kind of choice.
Holmberg considered the effect of both capacity constraints and the price cap,
and singled out a unique SFE for the special case of symmetric players with risk
of power shortage [25]. The unique SFE selected in [25] involves the end-point
of the differential equation with price equal to the price cap and quantity equal
to the generation capacity. At least for a case with symmetric suppliers, this
SFE is the most profitable one that can be achieved with the given generation
21
capacity and price cap. However, with high price caps, such as $2500/MWh
in actual electricity markets,2 this method may not significantly improve over
Green and Newbery’s method.
By observing that capacity constraints can possibly invalidate some
SFEs [8, 21], Genc and Reynolds intend to eliminate part of the SFE set from
the most competitive side by considering “pivotal” market participants [18],
whose absence would result in load curtailment at the price cap. However, the
eliminated SFE set are typically very small for realistic electricity markets.
Besides the efforts to eliminate some of the SFE by considering capacity
constraints, there are other researchers pursuing the same goal by refining the
equilibrium. Anderson & Xu performed a stability analysis for a two-player
discrete SFE model in [2]. However, they found that it would be difficult to
apply their analysis to a case with more players.
Baldick and Hogan applied a stability analysis to refine the equilibrium,
and they found a unique equilibrium for the symmetric linear marginal cost
case by ruling out equilibria that were unstable to a particular perturbation [8].
However, the perturbation considered in [8] to rule out equilibria is not “fair”
enough, because one of the SFEs, the Linear SFE (LSFE), is not perturbed at
all. It turns out that the only “not unstable” SFE under the perturbation is
indeed the LSFE. If we instead choose a similar perturbation that does affect
the LSFE, then the LSFE might be unstable as well. In a sense, their stability
2The CAISO nodal market currently imposes a $2500/MWh energy price cap.
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notion is too stringent to differentiate the continuum of SFEs into stable and
unstable.
Baldick and Hogan proposed another stability analysis in [9]. They as-
sumed that the supply functions are polynomials in order to be able to analyze
stability in a finite dimensional space. However, the best response mapping is
not a self map on the space of polynomial functions, so they assumed an ap-
proximation mechanism that maps an arbitrary function back to a polynomial
function in order to study the SFE stability in the polynomial function space.
Unfortunately, by making the approximation, they introduced another prob-
lem. That is, there is only one equilibrium (fixed point) for the approximated
best response mapping, namely the LSFE. Although they argued that similar
stability analysis could be performed for other SFEs as well, the analysis is
only valid for the LSFE.
We propose a novel stability analysis method in this chapter aimed at
overcoming the difficulties in [9]. Our method can analyze the stability of every
SFE, not just the LSFE. This is a significant improvement over Baldick and
Hogan’s method in [9], because being able to scrutinize every SFE enables
characterization of the stable SFE set. This could not be carried out with
Baldick and Hogan’s method.
A variation of the method in this chapter has been reported in [47].
In [47], we considered piecewise linear function perturbations based on Taylor
expansion, but we found it very difficult to generalize the analysis to high order
polynomial function perturbations. Therefore, we further developed the new
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method of this chapter to be able to handle high order polynomial function
perturbations. In this sense, [47] should be viewed as a preliminary result, and
this chapter provides a more thorough and advanced analysis.
The organization of the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2
recalls the SFE model as well as the best response, and demonstrates the equi-
librium continuum. Section 2.3 presents the SFE stability analysis method.
Section 2.4 applies the method to a symmetric example. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The SFE Model and the Equilibrium Continuum
We briefly review the SFE model in this section. We assume that
each generation company’s goal is to maximize its total profit over a time
horizon, and its profit does not only depend on its own supply function, but
also on its competitors’ supply functions. Essentially, this is a game with the
generation companies viewed as players, the supply functions as strategies,
and profits as payoffs. A Nash Equilibrium for the game, if it exists, can
be used to characterize the electricity market. This type of analysis has been
applied to the England and Wales market of the 1990s [7, 20, 21], to the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) market [26, 40], and to the Germany
market [42].
2.2.1 SFE and Best response Mapping
Consider a uniform price electricity market without transmission con-
straints. Our formulation mainly follows previous literatures [8, 9, 21]. Denote
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the market price by p, the supply functions by S = (Si)i=1,2,...,n, where n is the
total number of players in the market, each Si = Si (•) is a function from price
to quantity, and the cost functions by C = (Ci)i=1,2,...,n, where each Ci = Ci (•)
is a function from quantity to cost per unit time. We assume a continuous
load-time profile following Green and Newbery’s approach in [21] to interpret
the load-time profile as being equivalent to the uncertainty in Klemperer and
Meyer’s representation in [27]. That is, the demand function is in the following
form:
D(p, t) = N(t)− γp, t ∈ [t0, t1] ,




{N(t)}, Nmin = min
t∈[t0,t1]
{N(t)}.
Without loss of generality, we assume the supply functions are defined on
a finite price support [pmin, pmax] where pmin and pmax are, respectively, the
minimum and maximum realizable prices. For example, they can be the price
floor and price cap respectively if the price floor and price cap have been set
for the electricity market. We assume the supply functions are in the space of
second-order differentiable functions, i.e. (Si)i=1,2,...,n ∈ C2 ([pmin, pmax]) .
Suppose the generation marginal cost has the following linear form:
C
(1)
i (q) = ciqi + ei, ∀q > 0, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (2.1)
(Superscript (1) will be used throughout to represent first order differentia-
tion.) Each player tries to maximize its total profit over all the market clearing
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intervals. We consider a process where each generation company optimally
(profit-maximizing) updates its supply function in response to observations
of the residual demand function. The transmission-unconstrained best re-
sponse in a supply function model is characterized in [21, 27, 36]. It is the
same equation of (1.4) assuming the residual demand function is continuous
differentiable, and using the supply function instead of the offer function. We
rewrite the characterization as
Si (p) = − (p− C ′i (Si (p)))R′i (p) , (2.2)
where R′i (p) can be calculated by taking derivative on both sides of (1.1).
We distinguish corresponding values before and after the best response
update by adding superscripts “old” and “new” respectively, and rewrite (2.2)
in a best response form as in [21, 27]:
Snewi (p)
p− ciSnewi (p)− ei
= γ + S
old(1)















∀p ∈ [pmin, pmax] , ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
(2.3)
















The domain of β (•) is (C2 ([pmin, pmax]))n. Every SFE S? is a fixed point of
the best response mapping β (•), i.e.:















∀p ∈ [pmin, pmax] , ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
(2.5)
To qualify for a SFE, besides (2.5), the following must be satisfied:
1. every supply function is non-decreasing, i.e.
S
?(1)
i (p) ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ [pmin, pmax] , ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
2. every supply function satisfies the (for example, second-order sufficient)
conditions for profit maximization given all the other supply functions.
Notice that each SFE as characterized above does not depend on any specific
load-time profile N(t). Following Anderson and Hu [2], we call it a “strong”
SFE. By “strong” we mean the supply function optimality holds for every
possible price realization within the finite load support [Nmin, Nmax]. We only
consider “strong” SFEs in this chapter.
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2.2.2 SFE Continuum
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and I is the identity matrix.
With different end point conditions, we can trace out a continuum of
equilibria by solving (2.5) [25, 27]. For example, let us consider the simple sym-
metric SFE with quadratic cost, i.e. the symmetric SFE with linear marginal
















Klemperer and Meyer characterized the full range of the continuum of
the equilibria using the following function:
f (p, S)
∆










As analyzed by Klemperer and Meyer, there is a continuum of SFEs existing
between the two loci f (p, S) = 0 and f (p, S) =∞ in the p-S plane [27].
We demonstrate the continuum of SFEs in Fig. 2.1. The graph corre-
sponds to the symmetric linear marginal cost computational example we will
discuss in detail in section 2.4. In this case:







f (p, S) =∞ ⇔ p = cS + e,
which define straight lines.
Every point on the line D(p) = −γp + Nmax that is between the loci
f (p, S) = ∞ and f (p, S) = 0 can be an end point to solve the differential
equation (2.6). Therefore, there is a continuum of solutions to (2.6). The
“strong” SFEs are the portion of these solutions that are between the minimum
demand D(p) = −γp+Nmin and the maximum demand D(p) = −γp+Nmax .
The boundaries of the SFE continuum are the “least competitive SFE,” whose
end point is the intersection of f (p, S) = 0 and D(p) = −γp+Nmax, and the
“most competitive SFE,” whose end point is the intersection of f (p, S) = ∞
and D(p) = −γp+Nmax.
Note that there is wide range between the “least competitive SFE”
and the “most competitive SFE,” which greatly limits the predictive value of
the SFE model. In Fig. 2.1, we plot 50 SFEs evenly distributed between the
“least competitive SFE” and the “most competitive SFE,” to represent the
SFE continuum.
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Figure 2.1: A continuum of symmetric SFEs
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2.3 Stability Analysis of SFE
We have illustrated that there exists a continuum of strong SFEs. The
multiplicity of the SFE greatly limits its predictive value. We want to refine
the SFEs by a stability analysis. The major contribution of this chapter is to
refine the equilibria for finite demand support through a stability analysis.
The idea of stability analysis is motivated by Baldick and Hogan’s pa-
per [9]. Baldick and Hogan did not study strong SFEs as we do in this chapter.
Instead, they considered supply function equilibrium in the polynomial func-
tion space. Unfortunately, they were not able to find any other equilibrium
in the polynomial function space other than the linear SFE. As a result, they
studied the stability of the linear SFE in the polynomial function space, but
were not able to apply the same analysis to other nonlinear SFEs. In contrast,
we propose a stability analysis that is applicable to all strong SFEs.
2.3.1 Piecewise polynomial perturbations
We redefine the best response in terms of deviations. Consider devia-
tions from S?,
∆S = S− S?,
we denote the best response mapping in deviations by β̂, which is characterized
by:






Or, explicitly, β̂ is derived by rewriting (2.3) in terms of polynomial deviation
functions:
∆Snewi (p) = S
new














i (p) + S
?(1)
i (p)
) − S?i (p),
∀p ∈ [pmin, pmax] , ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(2.8)
Because S? is a fixed point of β(•), S?−S? = 0 is a fixed point of β̂(•).
Therefore, the stability problem of S? under β(•) is equivalent to the stability
problem of 0 under β̂(•).
In this chapter, we consider a specific class of perturbations to the
strong SFEs, namely perturbations specified by polynomial functions. For
each player i, the deviations ∆Si can be any order-m polynomial function,
where m is a predetermined positive integer. The polynomial deviations for

























where p0 is a price reference.
Before we can study the SFE stability in the polynomial function de-
viation space, there is one problem that needs to be resolved. As discussed
in [9], the range of the best response map (2.2.1) is the space of all continu-
ous differentiable functions, so generally the best response applied to polyno-
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mial deviation functions will not produce polynomial deviation functions, i.e.
β̂(∆Sold) may not be a polynomial function. In order to be able to analyze
the stability, we need a self map on a Banach space. In order to make the
best response map of deviations a self map defined on the polynomial func-
tion space, following [9], we regress the true best response map β̂(∆Sold) on
the polynomial function space for observations of the true map at particular
prices p1, . . . , pk, where k ≥ m. The coefficients of the regression polynomial
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with ∆Snewi (•) defined in (2.8). This defines the best response map in polyno-
mial deviation function space, or more precisely, in the space of the polynomial
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since 0 is a fixed point of β̂ (•).
The analysis can be easily generalized to piecewise polynomial function
perturbations, if the regression is performed in a piecewise manner, and we
repeatedly apply the same analysis on each of the polynomial segments. We
will demonstrate this through an example in section 2.4.
2.3.2 Stability Analysis
We analyze the stability of βp(•) at 0 in Rn(m+1).
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Definition 1 (Lyapunov Stability). Let ‖ • ‖ be a norm on vector space
Rn(m+1). The n-player SFE S? is said to be Lyapunov stable to order-m poly-
nomial deviation functions, which have the coefficients α ∈ Rn(m+1) , if for
any ε > 0, there exists δ(ε) > 0 such that if ‖α‖ < δ(ε),
∥∥βtp(α)∥∥ < ε, ∀t ∈ N. (2.10)
Definition 2 (Asymptotic Stability). The n-player SFE S? is said to be
asymptotically stable if it is Lyapunov stable and if there exists δ such that
if ‖α‖ < δ,
lim
t→∞
∥∥βtp(α)∥∥ = 0. (2.11)
A sufficient condition for asymptotic stability is the spectral radius of








where ρ (•) denotes the spectral radius. In the vicinity of 0, (2.12) implies
(2.11), and (2.11) implies the boundedness of (2.10), so that the asymptotic
stability definition is satisfied.
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Now we can calculate the Jacobian matrix and its spectral radius in
order to characterize the asymptotic stability.
2.4 Computational Example
In this section, we apply the stability analysis discussed in section 2.3 to
a computational example. First, we will demonstrate how the stability analysis
can effectively refine the SFEs. Then, we will also study the robustness of the
analysis against variations in regression models, which involve changes in:
• price reference,
• number of observations, and
• number of polynomial segments.
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2.4.1 Example Setup
The example is derived from [8]. All the parameters remain the same
as in [8] except the demand range [Nmin, Nmax]. The reason we change the
demand range in the example is to represent the daily load variation for an
electricity market more realistically.
The parameter values for the example are as follows. The demand
curve is D (p, t) = −γp + N (t). The parameter values are γ = 0.125, n = 3,
c = 0.5, e = 9, N (t) = 21 + 15t, t ∈ [0, 1]. The range of N(t) is [21, 36], which
represents a typical summer day load variation.3
Because there are infinitely many SFEs, it is impossible to explicitly
study the stability of every SFE. We discretize the SFE set into 50 represen-
tative SFEs by choosing 50 different end points on D(p, 1), that are evenly
distributed between f(p, S) = 0 and f(p, S) = ∞ as shown in Fig. 2.1.4 We
sort them in ascending order of competitiveness, so the “most competitive SFE
” is #1, and the “least competitive SFE” is #50. To gauge the effectiveness of
the refinement, we will consider the number of equilibria among the samples
that are asymptotically stable to perturbation under various model scenarios
of the regression model setup.
3For example, the CAISO day-ahead market load varied from 22.2 GW to 36.4 GW for
trade day July 10th, 2009.
4If the original SFE set had been discretized more finely than just 50 samples, we may
be able to observe a more accurate stable SFE distribution in the continuum, but for the
purpose of this study, a sample size of 50 seems to be large enough.
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2.4.2 Regression Model Setup
There are many ways to set up a polynomial regression model, and
it is a subjective choice. We will test the robustness of this analysis against
variations in the regression model. We will apply the same stability analysis
to several regression model scenarios that cover the following choices:
• price reference,
1. p0 = 0, 0 is a common choice for polynomial regression;
2. p0 = e, as a cost function parameter, e might be a “focal” choice;
• number of observations,
1. k = 24, assuming the observations are hourly, i.e. there are 24
observations corresponding to 24 hours of the day;
2. k = 2(m + 1), assuming the number of observations adapt to the
number of degrees of freedom in the regression but with a fixed
redundancy;
• number of polynomial segments
1. seg = 1, one piece regression;
2. seg = 3, break the supply function into 3 pieces evenly, and do
piecewise regression;
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With each factor having 2 choices, we will explore a total of 8 scenarios for the
regression model. The scenario with p0 = 0, k = 24, and seg = 1 is referred
as the base scenario.
2.4.3 Stability Analysis Results
The asymptotically stable SFEs for various orders m in the 8 different
scenarios are summarized in Tab. 2.1 and Tab. 2.2, and are plotted in Fig. 2.2.
We also list some of the calculated spectral radius data for the Jacobian in
Tab. 2.3 5. The data in Tab. 2.3 is for the base scenario only, which corresponds
to the second column in Tab. 2.1, and we have restricted the list to SFE
#1 to #10, as all the spectral radii are greater than one for SFE # greater
than 10. With the data in Tab. 2.3, one can verify the asymptotic stability
results in the second column of Tab. 2.1, where a less than one spectral radius
in Tab. 2.3 indicates a asymptotically stable SFE in the second column of
Tab. 2.1. The asymptotically stable SFEs under the other 7 scenarios are
determined in exactly the same way, and the asymptotic stability results are
listed in Tab. 2.1 and Tab. 2.2.
The first observation is that the stability analysis is very effective in
refining the SFEs. As shown in Tab. 2.1 and Tab. 2.2, even with linear func-
5The spectral radius calculation may encounter numerical difficulties due to ill-
conditioned Jacobian matrix, especially when m is larger than 5. This is caused by the
fact that high order regressors do not add much variability to the regression, and are nearly
linearly dependent on the low order regressors. Dealing with the numerical difficulty is out
of the scope of this chapter. On the other hand, this fact suggests that it is unnecessary
to pursue unrealistically high order polynomials in the regression, because it is not going to
improve the goodness of fit.
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p0 = 0 p0 = e p0 = 0 p0 = e
m k = 24 k = 24 k = 2(m+ 1) k = 2(m+ 1)
seg = 1 seg = 1 seg = 1 seg = 1
1 #1 – #8 #1 – #8 #1 – #8 #1 – #8
2 #2 – #4 #2 – #4 #2 – #4 #2 – #4
3 #3, #4 #3, #4 #3, #4 #3, #4
≥ 4 none none none none
Table 2.1: Asymptotically stable SFEs under polynomial function (1-piece)
deviations
p0 = 0 p0 = e p0 = 0 p0 = e
m k = 24 k = 24 k = 2(m+ 1) k = 2(m+ 1)
seg = 3 seg = 3 seg = 3 seg = 3
1 #2 – #7 #2 – #7 #2 – #7 #2 – #7
2 #3 – #4 #3 – #4 #3 – #4 #3 – #4
3 #4 #4 #4 #4
≥ 4 none none none none
Table 2.2: Asymptotically stable SFEs under polynomial function (3-piece)
deviations
tion perturbations, i.e. m = 1, only 6 or 8 SFEs out of the 50 samples are
stable. Empirically, the stable SFE set shrinks as m increases, and if a SFE
is stable under higher m, it is also stable under lower m. For cubic function
perturbations, i.e. m = 3, only 1 or 2 SFEs out of the 50 samples are stable.
If m is greater or equal than 4, the stable SFE set shrinks to an empty
set. This is consistent with Baldick and Hogan’s analysis of the stability of
the linear SFE [9], and they have raised the concern whether a SFE could be
sustained in practice. We will discuss more about this in the next section.
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m #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10
1 0.72 0.34 0.02 0.31 0.54 0.72 0.87 0.99 1.09 1.17
2 1.25 0.78 0.47 0.52 1.16 1.61 1.94 2.20 2.41 2.59
3 1.93 1.34 0.95 0.89 1.83 2.57 3.10 3.51 3.83 4.10
4 2.75 1.95 1.45 1.30 2.54 3.58 4.30 4.86 5.30 5.65
5 2.67 1.91 1.95 1.71 3.26 4.61 5.54 6.24 6.79 7.23
Table 2.3: Spectral radius in the base scenario
The second observation is that stable SFEs are located on the com-
petitive side of the continuum. There are no stable SFEs among the samples
with SFE # greater than 8. In other words, very uncompetitive SFEs are
unstable. This is consistent with the stability analysis in [47] and the actual
market results in [7].
The third observation is that the results are not very sensitive to the
choice of p0 and the number of observations. Let us compare different columns
in Tab. 2.1. The asymptotically stable sample SFE set does not change across
the selected different choices in price reference and number of observations.
The same phenomenon is observed in Tab. 2.2.
Compared with the price reference and the number of observations, the
results are slightly more sensitive to the number of regression segments. For
example, the m = 1 asymptotically stable SFE lower boundary in 2.1 is #1,
and the upper boundary is #8, while the m = 1 stable SFE lower boundary
in 2.2 is #2, and the upper boundary is #7.
Overall, the analysis is robust against variations in the regression model,
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Figure 2.2: Stable SFEs
which adds to its predictive value.
2.4.4 Practical Implication
We have demonstrated the effectiveness of the stability analysis method
in refining the SFEs in the previous section. However, with m greater than
or equal than 4, the stable SFE set shrinks to an empty set, which raises the
same concern as in [9] as to whether a SFE could exist in practice.
The concern boils down to the question of how the deviation functions
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are likely to be modeled in practice. Since piecewise linear functions and
piecewise quadratic functions are very common choices for approximating the
deviation functions in practice, the concern may not be a real problem, because
there exists stable SFEs that are able to withstand piecewise linear or piecewise
quadratic function perturbations.
Another factor that will further relieve the concern is the market par-
ticipants’ inertia in changing their offers in the real world. Consider a simple
model of inertia with a scalar as follows:









where κ ≤ 1, meaning that the supply function update can be slower than the
best response. Note that κ = 1 corresponds to the best response (2.4), and
smaller κ value represents larger inertia. In this case,

















so similar to (2.13), the elements in the Jacobian will be in the following form:
∂αnewi·
∂αoldi·







XTΛiXΦi, ∀j 6= i.
For the base scenario, the stable SFE set with κ = 0.6, κ = 0.4, κ = 0.1,
and κ = 0.01 are listed in Tab. 2.4. With some inertia, more SFEs are stable.
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m κ = 0.6 κ = 0.4 κ = 0.1 κ = 0.01
1 #1 – #8 #1 – #8 #1 – #8 #1 – #8
2 #1 – #4 #1 – #4 #1 – #4 #1 – #4
3 #1 – #4 #1 – #4 #1 – #4 #1 – #4
4 none #1 – #3 #1 – #3 #1 – #3
5 none #1 #1 – #3 #1 – #3
Table 2.4: Asymptotically stable SFEs under inertia
A small inertia of κ = 0.6 makes SFE #1 and #2 stable for m = 3, which are
unstable in Tab. 2.1. A large inertia of κ = 0.1 makes SFE #1, #2, and #3
to stand order 5 polynomial function perturbations 6, and the stable set does
not change with a larger inertia of κ = 0.01.
Because deviation functions are unlikely to be represented by high or-
der polynomials in practice, we can therefore expect SFEs to be exhibited
through market interaction, particularly if market participants are conserva-
tive in changing their offers through actions such as inertia.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we demonstrated how to use residual demand to char-
acterize the strategic behaviors and Nash equilibrium in the absence of trans-
mission constraint in a SFE model. We proposed a stability analysis method
to refine the SFEs. The system dynamics are defined by the best response
6Estimating the inertia in practice is out of the scope of this chapter. Hortaçsu and
Puller did some empirical study about the bidding behaviors in the ERCOT market [26],
which suggests that the inertia varies for different market participants.
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mapping based on the residual demand function, and the stability analysis is
performed in deviations space, i.e. we study the stability of the fixed point
0 under the best response mapping. We restrict our attention to polynomial
functions (and piecewise polynomial functions) perturbations, which result
from a regression of the true perturbation functions. We find that the stable
SFE set can be much smaller than the original set. Moreover, the method is
also very robust against variations in the regression model. This study also
implies that for practical deviations in the real world, stable SFEs can be sus-
tainable. The stability analysis method provides an effective way to refine the
SFEs, and thus improves the value of the SFE model in characterizing the
performance of electricity markets.
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Chapter 3
Characterizing Strategic Behaviors via
Transmission-Constrained Residual Demand
Derivative
In this chapter, we will generalize the residual demand concept to a
transmission-constrained network, and demonstrate how to use it to charac-
terize the strategic behaviors in electricity markets.
The organization of the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.1
presents the concept of transmission-constrained residual demand, and the
analytic calculation of its derivative. Section 3.2 provides one intuitive ex-
ample and two numerical examples taken from previous papers to verify our
calculation. In addition, Appendix A provides background knowledge about
ordinary least squares (OLS) problem and weighted least squares (WLS) prob-
lem, which are used in proving some of the transmission-constrained residual
demand derivative (TCRDD) properties. Section 3.3 improves the TCRDD
calculation efficiency and practical implementation. Section 3.4 proposes a
decoupled method to maximize a generator’s profit based on the TCRDD.
Section 3.5 applies the proposed profit maximization approach to the IEEE
118 bus system. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.1 Residual Demand and Its Derivative
In a typical electricity market, let us assume that different generators
are located at different buses, and index the generators by the bus number.
Under nodal pricing, transmission constraints will generally lead to different
nodal prices for different buses, so instead of having only one uniform market
price p, we will have a vector of nodal equilibrium prices:
p =
[
p1 p2 . . . pn
]T
assuming there are n buses in the system.
We assume that the demand at each bus depends on only its local
price, because in the short term, it is unlikely that a market participant could
shift loads between buses according to real time nodal prices. Currently, the
real-time prices are not published quickly enough to support this kind of load
response in electricity markets.
Accordingly, a generator’s residual demand will be a function of its
local nodal price. Write out the energy balance condition:
n∑
j=1
(Dj (pj)− Sj (pj)) = 0. (3.1)
By keeping a specific Si (pi)−Di (pi) on the left-hand side, and moving
all other terms to the right-hand side, we obtain
Si (pi)−Di (pi) =
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(Dj (pj)− Sj (pj)) . (3.2)
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Before we continue, to simplify notation, we combine each generator’s
supply function with the demand curve at the same bus by treating demand
as negative supply, and this process will result in only one supply function left




−Sj (pj) . (3.3)
The market clearing condition for the residual market at bus i implies that
the residual demand equals supply, i.e.:
Ri (pi) = Si (pi) . (3.4)
Without loss of generality, we are going to characterize the transmission-
constrained residual demand, and its derive R′i (pi) at a specific bus i. We
choose this bus to be the slack bus, and reorder all the system buses to num-
ber this chosen bus to be bus n. That is, we want to characterize the residual
demand, and calculated its derivative R′n (pn) at the slack bus n. The cor-
responding offer cost function, whose derivative is the offer function or the




i (Si (pi)) , ∀pi. (3.5)
Also we assume the functions Oi (•) , ∀i = 1, . . . , n are strictly convex and
twice differentiable.







Oi (qi) , (3.6)
s.t. Hq ≤ Z, (3.7)
qminn ≤ qn ≤ qmaxn , (3.8)
1Tq = 0. (3.9)
where
• bus n is the slack bus,
• q =
[
q1 q2 . . . qn
]T
is the nodal power injection quantity vector,
• (3.7) consists of the transmission constraints and the generation capacity
constraints for non-slack buses (suppose there are totally m of them),
• H is a m×n matrix consisting of the submatrix of power transfer distri-
bution factors (PTDFs) corresponding to the transmission constraints
and the submatrix representing the capacity constraints for non-slack
buses,
• Z consists of the transmission capacity limits and the generation capacity
limits for non-slack buses,
• 1 =
[





• (3.8) is the generation capacity constraint, that specifies the upper and
lower limits of the domain of the offer cost function at the slack bus, and
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• (3.9) is the energy balance constraint.
There are two widely used OPF formulations. One is to consider elastic
demands, and the OPF objective is to maximize total social welfare, as is used
in the day-ahead market; the other is to consider inelastic demand, and the
OPF objective is to minimize total generation cost, as is used in the real-time
market. We use the first OPF formulation in this chapter to derive the residual
demand derivative. However, we stress that the methodology is applicable to
both OPF formulations.
We intend to calculate the residual demand derivative evaluated at the
current market operating point. The current market operating point is de-
termined by the OPF solution. Therefore, the residual demand derivative
calculation is a post-OPF analysis. Given an OPF solution, we know which
constraints are binding in the OPF formulation. Given these binding OPF
constraints at the solution, we will form the Lagrangian for the OPF prob-
lem (3.6)–(3.9) including only binding constraints. Let us denote the binding
constraints by subscript “b”. The calculation needs to be separated into two
cases:
• the slack bus generation capacity constraint (3.8) is not binding, and
• the slack bus generation capacity constraint (3.8) is binding,
but we will see that the two cases result in the same expression for the residual
demand derivative.
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3.1.1 Non-binding slack bus generation capacity constraint










b (Hbq− Zb) . (3.10)
The first-order necessary conditions (FONCs) of (3.10) are
O′i (qi) = λ+ µ
T
b H̄bi, i = 1, . . . , n− 1, (3.11)
O′n (qn) = λ, (3.12)






• H̄b is a mb × (n− 1) matrix generated by eliminating the n-th column
(all elements in this column are zeros) of Hb,
• H̄bi is the i-th column of Hb,
• q̄ is obtained from q by eliminating the n-th entry,
• Zb consists of the binding transmission capacity limits and the binding
generation capacity limits for non-slack buses, and
• by defnition, λ is the LMP for the at the slack bus n, and the right hand
side of (3.11) is the LMP for other buses.
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There are n+mb +1 equations, and n+mb +1 variables in the FONCs
(3.11)–(3.14), so the FONCs are uniquely solvable assuming regularity condi-
tions. Denote the solution by
[
q̂1 . . . q̂n λ̂ µ̂b1 . . . µ̂bmb
]T
.
The FONCs characterize a market clearing point. From the perspective





the intersection of its own offer cost function and the residual demand func-
tion. If the generator located at the slack bus changes its offer function, the
market will clear at a different point, which is the new intersection point of
the changed offer function and the residual demand function. In other words,
the market clearing points generated by changing the offer function of the
generator located at the slack bus are all points on the residual demand func-
tion. Therefore, the residual demand function is characterized by the locus of
the market clearing points (λ, qn) obtained by changing the generator’s offer
function.
That is, if we remove the equations that contain the offer information
of the generator located at the slack bus from the FONCs, the remaining equa-
tions characterize the residual demand function, because the residual demand
function should not depend on a generator’s own offer information. In the
FONCs (3.11)–(3.14), (3.12) contains O′n (•), which is based on the offer cost
function of the generator located at the slack bus, so we should remove it
from the FONCs to characterize the residual demand function. With (3.12)
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removed, we have n + mb equations, namely (3.11), (3.13) and (3.14), and
n + mb + 1 variables left in the FONCs, so there is one degree of freedom.
The one degree of freedom implicitly characterizes a locus of (λ, qn), i.e. the
residual demand curve.
3.1.2 Binding slack bus generation capacity constraint
Consider that the upper generation capacity constraint is binding at
the slack bus. The Lagrangian for (3.6)–(3.9) including only the binding con-









b (Hbq− Zb) + ρmax (qn − qmaxn ) , (3.15)
where without loss of generality, we have assumed that the maximum genera-
tion capacity constraint is binding. A similar analysis applies for the minimum
generation capacity constraint. The FONCs of (3.15) are:
O′i (qi) = λ+ µ
T
b H̄bi, i = 1, . . . , n− 1, (3.16)
O′n (qn)− ρmax = λ, (3.17)








Denote the solution of (3.16)–(3.20) by
[





We need to clarify that generally speaking, we could not choose a bus
with binding generation capacity constraint as the slack bus to solve problems
involving power flow. The reason why we can do this in this case is that
the OPF is already solved, so in this post-OPF analysis, from the optimality
conditions point of view, it does not matter which bus is the slack bus as long
as the FONCs (3.16)–(3.20) are satisfied.
For the same reason as in section 3.1.1, we need to remove the equations
that contain the offer information of the generator located at the slack bus from
the FONCs (3.16)–(3.20). Again, (3.17) contains O′n (•), and thus should be
removed. In this case, in addition, another equation, (3.20), should also be
removed, because it specifies the upper limit of the offer function domain, and
thus On (•) and (3.20) together characterize the offer information.
Note that if (3.17) and (3.20) are removed, the remaining equations
(3.16), (3.18) and (3.19) are exactly the same as (3.11), (3.13) and (3.14).
3.1.3 Sensitivity analysis
Now we are going to calculate the residual demand derivative at bus n
by simultaneously solving (3.11), (3.13), and (3.14), which has one degree of
freedom that characterizes a locus of (λ, qn).
Consider simultaneous equations (3.11), (3.13), and (3.14) parameter-
ized by λ. By the implicit function theorem, if second-order sufficient condi-
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tions hold, then a unique function
[
q̃1 . . . q̃n µ̃b1 . . . µ̃bmb
]T
(λ)
exists in a neighborhood of λ̂ that solves (3.11), (3.13), and (3.14). Further-
more,
[










Because the equations, which contain the offer information at the slack
bus, have been removed, the quantity qn in (3.14) is actually the residual
demand quantity Rn, so we replace qn by Rn in the left-hand side of (3.14),
and therefore (3.14) becomes:
Rn (λ) = −
n−1∑
i=1
q̃i (λ) . (3.22)
We are interested in the residual demand derivative, i.e. the derivative of















Sensitivity analysis enables us to calculate the derivative of
[
q̃1 . . . q̃n µ̃b1 . . . µ̃bmb
]
(λ)
with respect to λ evaluated at λ̂. It may be that the sensitivity is not defined
due to non-differentiability, and we will briefly discuss this case in section 3.1.5
below.
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From (3.11) and (3.13), we get
O′i (q̃i (λ)) = λ+ µ̃
T
b (λ) H̄bi, i = 1, . . . , n− 1, (3.24)













can be calculated by totally differentiating (3.24) and (3.25)
with respect to λ to obtain O
′′




























1 1 . . . 1
]T︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1






















































and Ī is the (n− 1) × (n− 1) identity matrix. Because we assume the strict
convexity of O
′′






















We need to clarify that this residual demand derivative is the residual
demand derivative for bus n as a whole, i.e. the local actual demand at bus
n has been combined with the supply at the same bus. Therefore, from the
point of view of the generator located at bus n, its residual demand derivative
is actually (3.31) plus the local demand derivative at bus n, if there is any
local demand.
For convenience in the above analysis, we calculate the residual demand
derivative at the slack bus. Notice that (3.31) indicates that the residual de-
mand derivative only depends on Λ and H̄b, which are reduced matrices (with
rows and/or columns corresponding to the slack bus deleted). For residual
demand at an arbitrary bus k, all we need to do is to reconstruct Λ and H̄b
assuming that bus k is chosen as the slack bus in order to make use of (3.31).
The approach in this chapter can also be viewed as a generalization of
the methods in [32] and [28]. References [32] and [28] calculate the sensitivities
of the generation dispatches to offer prices considering the transmission con-
straints. Our approach generalizes their methods in that we can handle any
type of offer functions and not just fixed price offers. Our emphasis is on the
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residual demand, whose derivative reveals the sensitivities of the generation
dispatch to the incremental market price changes. We demonstrated that these
sensitivities are independent of the offer functional forms but do depend on
the binding generation capacity and transmission constraints. We can handle
all these constraints without any difficulty, whereas the methods in [19] and
[20] cannot directly handle the binding generation capacity constraints.
3.1.4 Weighted least squares regression interpretation
The formula in (3.31) is the negative summed square error (SSE) of
the following linear weighted least squares (WLS) regression problem: regress
1 on each column of H̄b, and use Λ as the weight matrix. Suppose we have
n− 1 observations (Yi,Xi), ∀i = 1, . . . , n− 1, where[
Y1 Y2 . . . Yn−1
]T
= 1̄ ≡ Y, (3.32)[
X1 X2 . . . Xn−1
]
= H̄b ≡ XT. (3.33)
The linear WLS regression problem is to find an optimal mb× 1 vector












where wi, i = 1, . . . , n, satisfy
w1 0 . . . 0





0 0 . . . wn−1
 = Λ. (3.35)
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Such a least squares interpretation helps us gain insight into the orig-
inal problem. (It is interesting that least squares interpretations are widely
observed. Another example in the context of nodal prices can be found in [35],
although the specific topic is somewhat different.)
From WLS theory (see Appendix A), we know that the WLS problem
(3.34) could be transformed into an equivalent ordinary least squares (OLS)
problem. Define
Y∗ = Λ1/2Y, (3.38)






1 0 . . . 0
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The solution to this OLS (3.41) problem is exactly the same as the
























The residual of the OLS problem (3.41) with bOLS specified in (3.42) is









From OLS theory (see Appendix A), we know X∗ is orthogonal to e∗,
i.e.




























from (3.28). Note that (3.47) is the same as (3.27).
The orthogonality condition (3.45) produces the same equation as (3.27),
so we would like to call equation (3.27) the orthogonality equation of binding
constraints. The meaning of (3.27) is that when binding constraints do not
change, the Jacobian of the constraints (H̄b in this case) is orthogonal to the
60













not change these binding constraints: no active constraints will be violated,
and no active constraints will become non-binding. It is the orthogonality
equation of binding constraints that makes possible the WLS interpretation.
In addition, from WLS theory (see Appendix A), we can deduce the
following properties about the residual demand derivative.
Proposition 3. If Λ is positive definite, then the residual demand derivative
is less than or equal to zero.
Proposition 4. Enforcing a new linearly independent binding constraint in




)T 6= 0, (3.48)
and
MX∗1̄
T 6= 0, (3.49)






and H̄Addedb is an added row to H̄b.
In particular, if there is no transmission congestion, the residual de-
mand derivative is −1̄TΛ1̄. When transmission is congested, the residual
demand derivative decreases in absolute value, because:∣∣∣∣dRndλ (λ̂)
∣∣∣∣ = SSE∗C ≤ 1̄TΛ1̄ = SSE∗NC, (3.51)
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where the subscript “C” denotes “transmission congested,” and the subscript
“NC” denotes “transmission uncongested.” This implies that when transmis-
sion constraints bind, the players have more incentive to exert market power
because of the decrease in magnitude of the residual demand derivative.
We have assumed that there is no perfectly elastic supply at any bus
in the derivation of (3.31). If there is perfectly elastic supply at some bus
then (3.31) is not valid, because we cannot invert a singular matrix to get Λ
in (3.30). To consider perfectly elastic supply, we will analyze the limit of the
residual demand derivative as some diagonal elements of Λ go to infinity. We
are especially interested in the conditions under which the residual demand
derivative goes to infinity, i.e. the residual demand is perfectly elastic.
Theorem 5. Suppose there are l buses (i1, i2, . . . , il) each with its supply
derivative going to infinity, and denote the set composed of i1, i2, . . . , il as N. If
the following equation (3.52) has solution then the residual demand derivative
at the slack bus is bounded; otherwise, the residual demand derivative at the





β = 1l, (3.52)
where 1l =
[






Proof. 1) Suppose (3.52) has a solution β̂. From (3.34), we have
min
β












Therefore, if (3.52) has solution, the residual demand derivative at the
slack bus is bounded.
2) Suppose (3.52) does not have a solution. Choose any β̃ that satisfies














From (3.34), we have
min
β











































































Therefore, if (3.52) does not have solution, the residual demand derivative at
the slack bus is unbounded.
Generally speaking, if the number of buses with perfectly elastic supply
is greater than the number of binding constraints, then the residual demand
derivative at the slack bus is unbounded, because there are more equations
than variables in (3.52), unless enough number of equations in (3.52) are re-
dundant. When the residual demand derivative is bounded, it could be calcu-
lated from the WLS problem (3.34). Essentially, all buses that have perfectly
elastic supply must have zero residual:
e∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ N, (3.57)
in order to zero out the arbitrarily large wi, ∀i ∈ N. We will show an example
for this case in section 3.2. The WLS interpretation and the fact (3.57) have
an important implication. Increasing the quantity-price response makes the
electricity market more competitive. As shown in (3.35), larger quantity-price
response will have a larger weight in the WLS problem. However, increased
quantity-price response is not effective if binding transmission constraints pre-
vent the large quantity-price responses from “spreading out” to the whole
system. Our analysis allows the determination of the quantity-price response
in the presence of transmission constraints.
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3.1.5 Non-differentiable case
The OPF solution might be at a point of non-differentiability. In other
words, the sensitivity with respect to the slack bus price is not defined. This
occurs when there are just binding constraints, and/or the current OPF solu-
tion is at a point of non-differentiability of a supply function. If we encounter
the case where the left side and right side residual demand derivative exist,
but they are not equal, we could calculate the left side and right side residual
demand derivative, respectively. If we can determine which constraints are
binding as the price at bus n increases or decreases then the left side and right
side residual demand derivatives are specified by (3.31) or can be calculated
by the equivalent WLS problem for perfectly elastic supply/demand case with
the corresponding binding constraints. Determining the binding constraints in
general involves enumerating each possible combination of binding constraints
and, for each, checking if the solution implied by sensitivity analysis will in-
deed induce the same the set of binding constraints. Similar analysis is also
necessary in the case that the OPF solution is at a kink point of a supply
function; that is, the left side derivative does not equal right side derivative.
3.2 TCRDD Examples
In the section, we verify the TCRDD calculation in 3 examples.
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3.2.1 Example 1: intuitive 2-bus case
Consider the simplest case of a two-bus system connected by a single
transmission line, and the line is congested.
Many researchers have adopted this example to illustrate the transmis-
sion effect on the equilibrium. (For example, see Borenstein, Bushnell, and
Stoft [11].) It is observed that the market equilibrium just resembles the com-
bination of two decoupled single bus system equilibria. We will demonstrate
that the analysis in section 3.1 is consistent with this observation. We com-
pute the residual demand at bus 2, and choose it as the slack bus. Because
mb = 1 and n = 2, H̄b is a 1 × 1 matrix, and H̄b = 1. Substitute H̄b = 1










= 0, which implies
that the supply at bus 1 is not affected by the price at bus 2. Also Substitute






= 0. Since we have combined the
supply and demand at bus 2, so this implies that the residual demand at bus
2 is just the derivative of the actual local demand derivative at bus 2, and
the market at bus 1 does not affect the residual demand derivative at bus 2.
Similar results hold for bus 1. These results verify the intuitive result that the
market is decoupled in this case.
3.2.2 Example 2: numerical 4-bus case
This example is illustrated in Fig. 3.1 We consider a two-loop system
from [48]. Each branch admittance equals 0.1. There are two generators





43 0  M W
c a p a c i t y
Figure 3.1: 4-bus system
The marginal generation cost functions and demand functions in bus
order are:
Generation Load
pG1 = 10 + 0.35q1 DL3 = 200− 1.92p3
pG2 = 10 + 0.45q2 DL4 = 150− 1.54p4
Branch 1–3 has a transmission capacity limit of 30 MW, all the other
branches have transmission capacity limits of 400 MW. Following Xu and Yu,
we consider the existence of a transmission-constrained linear SFE for this
case. The transmission-constrained linear SFE
Si(pi) = βi(p− αi), i = 1, 2, · · · , n
is characterized by [48]
β∗i
1− ciβ∗i
= −R′∗i , (3.58)
α∗i = ei. (3.59)
where generator i’s linear marginal cost function is C ′i (qi) = ciqi + ei.
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Table 3.1: Results comparison
Now we demonstrate that our analysis confirms to the numerical results
in [48]. The way we verify it is as follows.
A linear supply function best response could be calculated directly from
a generator’s profit maximization problem as Xu and Yu did in [48]. Because
the supply function best response and the residual demand derivative satisfy
(2.2), we could solve for the residual demand derivative with a given supply
function best response. The solution is (3.58). We used Xu and Yu’s numerical
supply function best response solutions as input, and solved for numerical
residual demand derivatives using (3.58). Recall that we have derived the
analytical solution of the residual demand derivative in (3.31). Therefore, we
could compare our analytic solutions derived in this chapter with the numerical
solutions recovered from Xu and Yu’s results using (3.58).
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In particular, denote the output of the algorithm in [48] by β̂, which is





Then we calculate analytically the R′∗i values evaluated at β̂, and compare R
′∗
i
calculated analytically to R̂′i from the output of the algorithm in [48]. The
results are summarized in Table I.





The smaller the REi, the more closely our results conform with Xu and Yu’s
results.
Table I shows that the relative error is in the range of 5% to 0.02%.
Moreover, as the numerical accuracy of Xu and Yu’s results increases as spec-
ified by a tolerance parameter in the stopping criterion of Xu and Yu’s algo-
rithm, REi decreases which indicates a better confirmation. The parameter
Tol is the tolerance control parameter in [48], which controls the output ac-
curacy of the bidding parameter β̂. Note that smaller Tol results in smaller
REi.
From the results we conclude that the characterization in this chapter
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Figure 3.2: 3-bus example with perfectly elastic supply
3.2.3 Example 3: numerical 3-bus case with perfectly elastic sup-
ply
This example is taken from [12], and we simplify it by only considering
information that is relevant to the residual demand derivative calculation. As
illustrated in Fig. 3.2, it is a three-bus system with line 2–3 having a capacity
600 MW. All other lines have very large capacity, and cannot be congested.
All three lines have the same impedance. There are three generators G1, G2,
and G3 located at the corresponding buses. G1 bids a linear supply function
with slope:
S ′1 (p) = 1000MW/ (cent/kWh) ,
and G3 has perfectly elastic supply. There is only one load, which is located
at bus 3.
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We want to calculate the residual demand derivative at bus 2, so we
designate bus 2 as the slack bus. Since there is a perfectly elastic supply at
bus 3, we can use the WLS interpretation technique to calculate the residual












































































Therefore, the residual demand derivative at bus 2 is −250.






Generally, the optimal WLS coefficients should make the residual, correspond-
ing to a bus with perfectly elastic supply, equal to zero. Otherwise, the WLS
problem will be unbounded.
In [12], Cardell, Hitt, and Hogan characterized the inverse of the resid-
ual demand derivative at bus 2 in equation (2). Their calculation is based on
their intuitive price relationship:
p2 = 2p1 − p3.
They obtained the solution –0.004 for the inverse residual demand derivative
as indicated in equation (3.1) in [12]. Therefore, our calculation is consistent




3.3 Improving TCRDD Calculation
In this section, we will discuss how to improve the TCRDD calculation
to make it practical for real applications.
3.3.1 Practical issues with the TCRDD calculation to be resolved
For simplicity, the TCRDD formula (3.31), is derived under several
assumptions. From the practical perspective, it has several limitations.
First, we assumed that each bus has at most one generator in deriving
(3.31). This is not realistic for power system. In addition, offer functions and
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marginal cost functions are typically modeled by piecewise linear functions in
practice, because piecewise linear functions balance the accuracy and compu-
tational efforts very well. Existing advanced OPF solvers can handle piecewise
linear offer functions. They typically model a piecewise linear offer function by
multiple linear segments, and each segment has an associated variable. Each
variable will have its capacity constraints to make sure it cannot go out of the
segment. In this case, we may have multiple offer segments on every bus that
may belong to different generators. Without loss of generality, we can model
each generator offer segment as a “generator,” so we may have multiple “gen-
erators” at each bus. The first generalization is to handle multiple generators
at a single bus.
Second, some electricity markets require step offer functions, such as
the California nodal market. If the offer functions are step functions, then
“generator” g will have O′′g (q̂g) = 0, which may make Λ in (3.30) undefined
because of matrix singularity. Generally speaking, this is a modeling issue, be-
cause O′′g (q̂g) is only used for calculating the TCRDD, and it is not a required
information in an OPF solver. This issue can be handled by estimating the
O′′g (q̂g) information in the TCRDD calculation. Some estimating techniques
are discussed in [44]. As illustrated in Fig. 3.3, a step offer function segment
can be approximated by a straight line connecting middle points of adjacent
segments in the TCRDD calculation, so that the dashed line will have a non-
zero O′′g (q̂g). Note that the O
′′
g (q̂g) estimation is only needed for post-OPF
TCRDD calculation, and does not affect the OPF solver. The TCRDD cal-
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Figure 3.3: Estimating the derivative for step offer function
culation as an OPF post-processing step is flexible as to the choice of OPF
solver and offer function approximation algorithm.
Even with slope estimation, it is still possible to have a zero O′′g (q̂g).
An example is a generator bidding all its capacity at a constant price, and it
is setting the LMP at its bus. In this case, we need to explicitly consider zero
O′′g (q̂g) in the TCRDD derivation in order to get an applicable formula.
Third, another problem arises when there are some generators’ output
binding at their capacity limit or a constant output level, in which case O′′g (q̂g)
in [44] does not exist. Treating piecewise segments as “generators” in order to
handle piecewise offer functions makes this this much more likely to happen.
For a generator with multiple offer segments, either all segments or all but one
segment will be binding at the corresponding segment size limit. We need to
explicitly consider this case in the TCRDD derivation as well.
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3.3.2 Generalizing the TCRDD Calculation
To overcome the three limitations discussed in the previous section, we
are going to derive a more general formula in this section. We consider the





Og (qg) , (3.61)
s.t. HGqG −HLqL ≤ Z, (3.62)





qg = 0, (3.64)
where
• G is the set of generators, with each segment of an offer represented by
a distinct element,
• L is the set of loads,
• qG is the generator output variable vector,
• qL is the load vector,
• Og (qg) is generator g’s total offer cost function, whose derivative, O′g (qg),
is generator g’s offer function,
• HG is the generator shift factor matrix corresponding to the transmission
constraints,
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• HL is the load shift factor matrix corresponding to the transmission
constraints,
• qminG consists of generator output capacity lower limits,
• qmaxG consists of generator output capacity upper limits,
• Z consists of the transmission capacity limits,
• (3.62) consists of the transmission constraints,
• (3.63) is the generator capacity constraint, and
• (3.64) is the energy balance constraint.
Although this OPF model seems very simple, it is general enough to
capture the advanced features in production level OPF programs.1 Currently,
most production level OPF programs in existing and proposed nodal electric-
ity markets, are either DC, or solve AC by successive linearization, such as
the CAISO nodal market and the proposed ERCOT nodal market. For DC
OPF, our model and results are directly applicable. For AC OPF solved by
successive linearization, the typical scheme is discussed in [13], where the AC
OPF is decoupled into two subproblems, namely the optimization problem and
the network assessment problem. The network assessment problem is to solve
1This is a single interval OPF model, which is applicable to most the real-time electricity
markets in the US, such as PJM, ISO-NE, and ERCOT. Very few electricity markets, such
as the California nodal market, solve a multi-interval OPF with looking-ahead capability in
the real-time market, where they include the inter-temporal constraints, such as the ramp
constraints. Handling these inter-temporal constraints is out of the scope of this dissertation.
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the AC power flow and contingency analysis, and generate a list of overloaded
(and/or nearly overloaded) lines to be passed to the optimization problem as
constraints. It also calculates certain sensitivities, such as the shift factors, so
that the constraints can be modeled linearly in the optimization problem. The
optimization problem solves the OPF program using the linearized constraints
passed from the network assessment problem. The optimization problem and
network assessment problem will be solved iteratively, so that if the process
converges, it converges to a solution to the original OPF problem. The ad-
vantage of this decoupled method is that the optimization problem with only
linearized constraints is much easier to solve than the original problem, so this
method is able to solve large scale problem. The linearized OPF optimiza-
tion problem in production level OPF program is essentially the same as the
DC OPF problem we consider in this chapter. The security constraints and
stability constraints can be modeled in (3.62) with the HG and HL being the
outage compensated shift factors ([45] chapter 11 Appendix), and the Nomo-
gram shift factors. Therefore, the DC OPF model and results are also directly
applicable to an AC OPF solved by successive linearization.
For pure AC OPF solved by nonlinear programming, it requires extra
work to be able to use the method in this chapter. Basically, one needs to
calculate the shift factors and other sensitivities in order to formulate the
problem as (3.61) – (3.64).
Therefore, generally speaking, working with the DC OPF model (3.61)
– (3.64) is not limiting the value of this work. The purpose of this work is not
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to compete with the most advanced existing OPF programs, but to make the
best use of them to develop bidding strategies rather than start from scratch.
This OPF model is more general than the one used in section 3.1,
because multiple generators at the same bus can be explicitly modeled using
the generator shift factors instead of node shift factors. Also, we separate the
transmission constraints and generation capacity constraints here, whereas
section 3.1 considers them together.
The subsequent derivation largely follows section 3.1, and we will only
cover the steps that are different from section 3.1 in order to overcome the
three limitations discussed in the previous section.
As discussed in section 3.1, the TCRDD is a post-OPF calculation. An
OPF variable with a hat represents the OPF solution, and the binding trans-
mission constraints are denoted by a subscript “b”. We assume the market
is cleared by LMPs determined from the OPF solution. Denote the LMP at
the slack bus by λ. The OPF solves at the slack bus price λ = λ̂. Following
section 3.1, without loss of generality, we calculate the TCRDD for a generator
s located at the slack bus n. Because the TCRDD is a post-OPF calculation,
any bus can be designated as the “slack” bus for TCRDD calculation purpose,
and it is not necessary to use the same slack bus that is used in the OPF.
Partition the generators other than generator s into three subsets: the
generator segments with binding output quantities, denoted by f; the generator
segments with binding price offers, denoted by z; and the generator segments
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Accordingly, partition HGb into:
HGb =
[
Hvb Hfb Hzb 0
]
.
Similarly to section 3.1, we consider the OPF solution to be parame-


































































where 1v, 1f , and 1z are column vectors of 1s whose dimensions equal the


















in order to compute the TCRDD.
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+ µTb (Hvbqv + Hfbqf + Hzbqz −HLbqL − Zb)
































O′v (qv)− λ1v −HTvbµb = 0v,
O′z (qz)− λ1z −HTzbµb = 0z,
Hvbqv + Hfbqf + Hzbqz −HLbqL = Zb,
(3.67)
where









= pz, i.e. binding offer prices,
• 0v, 0f , and 0z are column vectors of 0s whose dimensions equal the
number of generators in set v, f, and z respectively.
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If the number of binding price offers in set z is less than the number
of binding transmission constraints, and the number of binding transmission
constraints is less than the number of non-binding offers in set v, then (3.68)




















































The TCRDD can be calculated by substituting (3.66) and (3.69) into (3.65).
The whole derivation process follows section 3.1 with necessary changes
to overcome its limitations. One change is in the modeling. All generators
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except s are explicitly modeled here, and are divided into three sets, namely
the generators with binding capacity constraints, the generators with binding
price offers, and the generators with varying prices and output quantities. The
three sets of generators are treated differently. Transmission constraints and
generator capacity constraints are also treated differently. The new derivation
overcomes the limitations in section 3.1 discussed in the previous section, and
it is more widely applicable.
Another change is in the result. The new TCRDD formula only depends
on binding transmission constraints and the offers of the generators having
non-zero slopes, while the formula in section 3.1 depends on both transmis-
sion constraints and generation capacity constraints. If the offers are piecewise
linear or piecewise continuous functions, there will be a lot of binding gener-
ation capacity segments, which makes the matrix bigger and the calculation
inefficient. Comparing with the formula in section 3.1, this new formula im-
proves the computational performance.
What remains unchanged from section 3.1 is the concept of the TCRDD.
Similar to section 3.1, note that the LMP of the slack bus is a dual variable of
the OPF, so this is a variable to variable sensitivity analysis. Generator s’s of-
fer function does not factor into this sensitivity analysis (it does factor into the
OPF solution), so the sensitivities here evaluated at the OPF solution are in-
dependent of the slack bus generator’s offer function parameters. This unique
property makes this kind of sensitivity different from the ordinary variable to
parameter sensitivities, such as in [14] and [32].
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3.4 Maximize A Generator’s Profit Using the TCRDD
As discussed in section 1.3, the profit maximization can be calculated
based on the given residual demand curve, which suggests that the generator’s
profit maximization problem can be decoupled into two subproblems: the
upper subproblem of maximizing the generator’s profit based on TCRDD,
and the lower subproblem of calculating the TCRDD. This gives rise to the
new generator profit maximization approach in this chapter, and we will refer
it as the TCRDD approach hereafter. The TCRDD approach is illustrated in
Fig. 3.4. Note that in the TCRDD approach, the upper problem and lower
problem are not in nested structure, and can be solved separately. The whole
problem can be solved by iteratively solving the two subproblems. This is a
significant advantage over the MPEC approach because solving the two smaller
problems is much easier than solving the problem as a whole. In addition,
the lower subproblem is a standard OPF problem with a lightweight post-
processing step of the TCRDD calculation, so that existing advanced OPF
algorithms and solvers can be reused. This is another significant advantage
over the MPEC approach.
In this section, we propose an algorithm to maximize a generator’s
profit utilizing the TCRDD information that can be calculated in the way
discussed in section 3.3.
To make the idea easy to understand, we will illustrate the algorithm
in a very simply 4-bus system example. A larger scale 118-bus system example
will be solved and discussed in section 3.5. The 4-bus example is very similar
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Figure 3.5: 4-bus system
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to the one in section 3.2.2. As illustrated in Fig. 3.5, there are four generators
in the system, and each one is located at different bus. Generator 1 and 2
are 50 MW unit each. Generator 3 and 4 are 200 MW each. There are two
loads, 100 MW each, located at bus 3 and bus 4 respectively. Branch 1-3 has
a capacity limit of 30 MW. All other branches have capacities of 200 MW. All













Assume all generators bid in their true cost. We plot generator 1’s and gen-
erator 2’s profit functions and residual demand curves in Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7
respectively.
From now on, to simplify notation, we drop the subscript i in all the
variables and functions, p, q, RDD, Π and P , meaning that all the variables
and functions belong to the generator under consideration by default.
Generator 2 has a linear residual demand curve. Suppose the OPF
solves at q0 and p0 = P (q0) for generator 2, and the TCRDD evaluated at q0
is RDD(q0). We represent the inverse function of the residual demand curve,
P (q), by its tangent P (q; q0) at q0:
P (q; q0) =
1
RDD(q0)
(q − q0) + p0, (3.70)
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Figure 3.6: Profit function and residual demand curve for generator 1
























Figure 3.7: Profit function and residual demand curve for generator 2
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which is the solid line in Fig. 3.7. In this case, P (q; q0) matches P (q) exactly.






(q − q0) + p0
)
q − C(q). (3.71)
In this case, Π(q; q0) also matches Π(q) exactly, which is the dashed curve
shown in Fig. 3.7. Because generator 2’s cost function is quadratic, the profit
function is also quadratic.
The situation is more complicated for generator 1, because the residual
demand curve may have kinks when the set of binding transmission constraints
changes. This is demonstrated in Fig. 3.6, if generator 1’s output is less than
43 MW, branch 1-3 is not congested; while if generator 1’s output is greater
than 43 MW, branch 1-3 is congested (i.e. a binding constraint). The kink
in the residual demand curve will also result in a kink in the profit function.
In Fig. 3.6, the profit function is composed of two quadratic pieces with the
curvature change right at the kink, qx, of the residual demand curve.
Suppose we have two solved OPFs: one OPF solves at (qlo, plo), with
qlo ≤ qx, and the TCRDD evaluated at qlo is RDD(qlo); the other OPF solves
at (qhi, phi), with qhi ≥ qx, and the TCRDD evaluated at qhi is RDD(qhi). We
represent the inverse function of generator 1’s residual demand curve, P (q),
by two tangent lines at qlo and qhi respectively:
P (q; qlo) =
1
RDD(qlo)
(q − qlo) + plo, ∀q ≤ qx,
P (q; qhi) =
1
RDD(qhi)
(q − qhi) + phi, ∀q > qx.
(3.72)
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(q − qlo) + plo
)





(q − qhi) + phi
)
q − C(q), ∀q > qx,
(3.73)
and the two quadratic segments intersect at qx. In this case, our representa-
tions of the residual demand curve and the profit function are both exact.
Note that in this case the profit function is still concave, but in other
cases it may end up with two local optima with each of the residual demand
segment containing one local optimum, which also makes the profit function
not concave. It is generally difficult to find the global optimizer, and the
algorithm in this section is aiming at finding a local optimizer as most other
methods do, such as the MPEC method [23]. However, the approach in this
chapter can be provided with different initial points based on knowledge of the
kink to explore a broader region in order to get closer to the global optimizer.
If the whole residual demand curve is known, the task to find a local
profit optimizer is not difficult. However, constructing the whole residual
demand curve is computationally intense when there are changing binding
constraints, because one solved OPF only produces one point on the residual
demand curve. Conceptually, one can continuously solve OPFs to trace out
the residual demand curve for a generator as we do in Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7 for
the 4-bus system example, but for the purpose of profit maximization, tracing
out the whole residual demand curve is inefficient and unnecessary.
Because the decision variable for a generator is its output level, the
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problem to find a local optimum is basically a line search. There are various
existing standard inexact line search algorithms, such as the Wolfe condition
and the Armijo-Goldstein condition ([34] chapter 3), that are not designed
for finding an exact solution. An exact line search typically requires a large
number of function evaluations ([34] chapter 3), which may not be efficient for
this specific problem of a generator’s profit, because evaluating a generator’s
profit involves solving the OPF, which is computationally intense for large
scale systems.
In order to improve the performance, we developed a special algorithm
aimed at requiring less profit function evaluations. As will be demonstrated,
the algorithm will be able to find the profit optimum for generator 1 or gener-
ator 2 in the 4-bus system example within one iteration. Its performance will
be further tested in the IEEE standard 118-bus system example in section 3.5.
The algorithm we propose is a special bisection search scheme based
on approximating the residual demand curve by a two-piece linear function as
the generator 1’s residual demand curve in the 4-bus system example.
Suppose we have two output levels qlo and qhi with qlo < qhi. The resid-
ual demand curve can have many segments in [qlo, qhi] depending on the set of
binding constraints while changing its output level. Without the exact knowl-
edge of residual demand curve in [qlo, qhi], we estimate the residual demand
curve in a similar way as in (3.72). Denote the estimated two-piece quadratic
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profit function by
Π̂ (q; qlo; qhi) = Π̄ (q; qlo) , q ∈ [qlo,max{qlo, qx}] ,
Π̂ (q; qlo; qhi) = Π̄ (q; qhi) , q ∈ [min{qhi, qx}, qhi] ,
(3.74)
where qx denotes an intersection of P (q; qlo) and P (q; qhi) if they intersect,
otherwise, let qx = qhi .
Function Π̂ (q; qlo; qhi) exactly match the profit function in the vicinity
of Π(q) at qlo and qhi, but may differ from the profit function if the residual
demand curve differ from the estimated two-piece residual demand function
evaluated at qlo and qhi respectively.








because the profit function is continuous. We also know if (3.75) is satisfied,
argmax{Π̂ (q; qlo; qhi)} ⊆ {q̄(qlo), q̄(qhi), qx}, (3.76)
because Π̂ (q; qlo; qhi) is a two-piece quadratic function. If qlo ≤ qx ≤ qhi,
argmax{Π̂ (q; qlo; qhi)} can be determined as specified in Tab. 3.2 and illus-
trated in Fig. 3.8.
2Strictly speaking, argmax{•} represents the set of maximizers, but because it is a sin-
gleton for a quadratic objective function, we use the notation the maximizer “=”argmax{•}.
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condition characteristic maximizer of Π̂ (q; qlo; qhi)
q̄(qlo) /∈ [qlo, qx], q̄(qhi) /∈ [qx, qhi] no hump qx
q̄(qlo) ∈ [qlo, qx], q̄(qhi) /∈ [qx, qhi] left hump q̄(qlo)
q̄(qlo) /∈ [qlo, qx], q̄(qhi) ∈ [qx, qhi] right hump q̄(qhi)
q̄(qlo) ∈ [qlo, qx], q̄(qhi) ∈ [qx, qhi] double hump q̄(qlo) or q̄(qhi)
Table 3.2: Determine Maximizer Of Π̂ (q; qlo; qhi)
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Figure 3.8: Determine Maximizer Of Π̂ (q; qlo; qhi)
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Based on the profit function approximation argmax{Π̂ (q; qlo; qhi)}, we
design a special bisection search to find the optimizer. It has two consecutive
parts. The first part is to search for an interval [qlo, qhi] that satisfies (3.75),
and we call this part the local optimum searching loop. The second part is to
find a point in [qlo, qhi] that satisfies (1.4) through a special bisection procedure,
and we call it the bisection loop.
The bisection procedure is special in that the bisection point is chosen
from the candidate maximizers of Π̂ (q; qlo; qhi), instead of the standard choice
of 0.5 (qlo + qhi), unless the candidate choices {q̄(qlo), q̄(qhi), qx} ⊆ {qlo, qhi} .
The whole algorithm is as follows.
Local Optimum Searching Loop:
1. Start with an initial point q = q0.
2. Solve OPF with q = q0, and calculate RDD(q0) and q̄(q0).
3. If q̄(q0) = q0, optimal solution found with q∗ = q0, stop.
Or if q0 = qmax and q̄(q0) > q
max, optimal solution found with q∗ = qmax,
stop.
Or if q0 = qmin and q̄(q0) < q
min, optimal solution found with q∗ = qmin,
stop.
4. If q̄(q0) > q
0, let q1 = min{q̄(q0), qmax}, else let q1 = max{q̄(q0), qmin}.
Solve OPF with q = q1, and calculate RDD(q1) and q̄(q1).
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5. If q̄(q1) = q1, optimal solution found with q∗ = q1, stop.
Or if q1 = qmax and q̄(q1) > q
max, optimal solution found with q∗ = qmax,
stop.
Or if q1 = qmin and q̄(q1) < q
min, optimal solution found with q∗ = qmin,
stop.





Let qlo = min{q0, q1}, and qhi = max{q0, q1}, stop.
Otherwise, q0 = q1, and continue with step 4.
Bisection Loop:
1. If qhi − qlo < ε, where ε > 0 is the tolerance threshold, optimal solution
found with q∗ = 0.5 (qlo + qhi). Stop.
2. Calculate the bisection point qmid as follows.
• If P (q; qlo) and P (q; qhi) specify the same function, qmid = q̄(qlo).
• If P (q; qlo) and P (q; qhi) do not intersect, or they intersect at (qx, px)
with qx 6∈ [qlo, qhi], then qmid = 0.5 (qlo + qhi);
• Otherwise, determine the bisection point qmid as specified in Tab. 3.2.
For the double hump case, let
qmid = argmin
q∈{q̄(qlo),q̄(qhi)}
|q − 0.5 (qlo + qhi) |.
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3. Solve OPF with q = qmid, and calculate RDD(qmid) and q̄(qmid).
4. If q̄(qmid) = qmid, optimal solution reached with q
∗ = qmid. Stop.
5. If qmid = qx and pmid = px. Do an incremental test as follows.
• If RDD(qmid) = RDD(qlo), run OPF with q = qx + ε, and calculate
RDD(qx + ε), q̄(qx + ε). If q̄(qx + ε) ≤ qx + ε, then optimal solution
reached with q∗ = qx because qx satisfies (1.4). Stop.
• If RDD(qmid) = RDD(qhi), run OPF with q = qx− ε, and calculate
RDD(qx− ε), q̄(qx− ε). If q̄(qx− ε) ≥ qx− ε, then optimal solution
reached with q∗ = qx because qx satisfies (1.4). Stop.
6. If q̄(qmid) > qmid, qlo = qmid, else qhi = qmid. Continue with step 1.
After the local optimum searching loop, we either have found a local
optimum, or we end up with two output levels qlo and qhi that satisfies (3.75)
so that we can enter the bisection loop. In the 4-bus system example, for
generator 2, the local optimum searching loop will find the maximizer in step
5 after one iteration; for generator 1, the local optimum searching loop will
find two output levels qlo and qhi that satisfies (3.75) after one iteration.
The bisection loop has a quadratic rate of convergence if the residual
demand curves that contain the local optimizer have been correctly identified.
In the 4-bus system example, for either generator 1, the bisection loop will
find the maximizer in step 5 after one iteration.
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3.5 Computational Example
In this section, we apply the algorithm to the IEEE 118 bus test system.
There are 186 branches and 54 generators in the system. The total load in the
system is 4,242 MW. We optimize the profit for generator 5 located at bus 10
with 550 MW capacity. Branches 30-17, 26-30, 38-37 have capacities 200 MW
respectively, so they are likely to be the binding transmission constraints. All
other branches have capacities large enough such that the flows will be within
their limits. We plotted the residual demand curve and the profit function in
Fig. 3.9.
From the profit curve in Fig. 3.9, one can tell the maximizer is between
344 MW and 345 MW. We start with 40 MW for the optimization, which is far
away from the optimizer. The local optimum searching loop terminates after
one iteration with qlo = 40 and qhi = 439.4. The bisection terminated after two
iterations with the optimal solution q∗ = 344.76. The first bisection iteration
is a right hump case, and the second bisection iteration is a left humb case, as
specified in Tab. 3.2. The bisection trajectory is illustrated in Fig. 3.10.
3.6 Conclusion
We characterize the residual demand at the slack bus based on the
FONCs of the OPF problem. The residual demand curve is implicitly char-
acterized by eliminating the equations in the FONCs that contain the offer
information of the generator located at the slack bus. After doing that, there
is one degree of freedom left in the FONCs that defines a locus of (λ, qn), i.e.
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Figure 3.10: Bisection loop iterations
96
the residual demand curve. We obtain the residual demand derivative formula
(3.31) by sensitivity analysis viewing the price at the slack bus as a parameter
and assuming there is no perfectly elastic supply in the system. The solution
has a suggestive WLS interpretation. Several useful properties of the residual
demand derivative are implied by WLS theory. If there is perfectly elastic sup-
ply at some bus in the system, it is convenient to use the WLS interpretation
to analyze the limit of the residual demand derivative as the quantity-price
response of the bus goes to infinity. We establish the condition under which
the residual demand derivative at another bus will be bounded or unbounded
in this case.
The correctness of the residual demand derivative analytic formulation
is verified using an intuitive 2-bus system, a numerical 4-bus 2-loop system
from [48], and a 3-bus 1-loop system from [12].
We also improved the TCRDD calculation to make more appeals for
practical applications. We use the residual demand derivative formulation
to construct optimal bidding strategies in transmission-constrained networks.
We proposed a decoupled approach, which iteratively solves the subproblem of
calculating the TCRDD, and the subproblem of calculating the optimal offer.
Due to the decoupled structure of the TCRDD approach, it is suitable for
solving large scale problems. We designed a special bisection search method to
find the profit maximization strategy, which requires less function evaluations
than standard line search algorithms. We demonstrated the effectiveness of
this method in the IEEE 118-bus system.
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Chapter 4
Characterizing Strategic Behaviors Via
Transmission-constrained Residual Demand
Jacobian Matrix
A generation firm in electricity markets may own multiple generators
located at multiple locations. To characterize a generation firm’s residual de-
mand, this chapter generalizes the concept of transmission-constrained resid-
ual demand derivative from a single generator’s perspective to the concept
of the transmission-constrained residual demand Jacobian (TCRDJ) matrix
from a generation firm’s perspective. We will derive the formula to calculate
the Jacobian matrix based on a multi-parameter sensitivity analysis of the
optimal power flow, and also demonstrate how to use the matrix to optimize
a generation firm’s profit.
The organization of the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.1
derives the TCRDJ in a transmission-constrained network. Section 4.2 proves
the symmetry and negative semidefinite properties of the TCRDJ. Section 4.3
deals with binding quality offers and binding price offers. Section 4.4 proposes
a bundle trust region method to maximize a generation firm’s profit using the
TCRDJ. Section 4.5 demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed method in the
IEEE 118-bus system. Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.1 Calculating the TCRDJ
In this section, we will derive the TCRDJ formula. Following section
3.1 and section 3.3.2, we consider an offer-based electricity market. The market
is cleared by an OPF program minimizing the total generation offer cost. In
this section, We adopt the more general DC OPF model (3.61) – (3.64) used
in section 3.3.2.
Partition the generators into two sets A and Ā such that G = A ∪
Ā,A ∩ Ā = ∅, where set A consists of all the generators owned by a particular
generation firm A, and set Ā consists of all the generators that do not belong
to generation firm A.
Partition qG into sub-vectors qA and qĀ corresponding to the sets of






Oā (qā) , (4.1)
s.t. HĀqĀ ≤ Z + HLqL −HAqA, (4.2)











Denote the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints (4.2), (4.3),
and (4.4), by µ(qA), ρ(qA), and λ(qA), respectively. The optimization prob-
lem (4.1)–(4.4) implicitly defines a vector function representing the LMPs (as
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derived in (3.11) and (3.67)) for the generators in the set A:
PA(qA) = 1Aλ(qA) + H
T
Aµ(qA), (4.5)
where 1A is a column vector of 1s whose dimension equals the number of
generators in set A. By the inverse function theorem, if the Jacobian of PA(•)
is nonsingular, there exists an inverse function for PA(•) locally, which is
the vector residual demand function RA(•) faced by the generation firm, i.e.
P−1A (•) = RA(•), and the Jacobian of RA(•) equals the inverse of the Jacobian
of PA(•).
Now we calculate the Jacobian of PA(•), evaluated at an OPF solution.
For derivation simplicity, we assume there are no generators with binding offer
quantities or binding offer prices. Dealing with those binding offer quantities
and binding offer prices is the topic of section 4.3.
Construct the Lagrangian of the optimization problem (4.1)–(4.4) with















+ µTb (Zb + HLbqL −HAbqA −HĀbqĀ) ,
where the subscript “b” means the rows or entries corresponding to binding
constraints. We assume that the second-order sufficient conditions hold.




from a sensitivity analysis of the
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HĀbqĀ = Zb + HLbqL −HAbqA,
1TĀqĀ = 1
T
L qL − 1TAqA,
(4.6)








• 0Ā is a column vector of 0s whose dimension is equal to the number of
generators in the set Ā,
• 1A, 1Ā and 1L are column vectors of 1s whose dimensions equal the
number of generators in set A, the number of generators in set Ā, and
the number of loads in L respectively.






























is positive definite (P.D.), so that it is invertible. This is
always true if there are no offers in Ā with binding quantities or prices. We












Assume that the rows of HĀb are linearly independent and that the number of
rows is less than the number of generators in the set Ā so that M is invertible.






























































can be calculated by substituting (4.12) into (4.10).
Now we can calculate the Jacobian matrix ∂pA
∂qA
, with the (g, a) element














= −HTAbM−1HAb + UTUV −1, (4.14)
where















If the generation firm has only one generator, and the generator is
located at the slack bus s, then Hs = 0, where Hs is the column of H cor-




where V is the TCRDD formula (3.31). This verifies the correctness of our
calculation for this special case.
4.2 Properties of the TCRDJ
As proved in [19], the TCRDJ is symmetric and negative semidefinite
(N.S.D.) if the DC OPF only models the branch flow constraints. The TCRDJ
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derivation part of the paper can be viewed as a generalization of [19], because
as discussed in section 3.3.2, our OPF formulation can include all types of
linear constraints, such as contingency constraints and Nomograms. We are
going to prove the symmetry and N.S.D. properties of the TCRDJ holds with
all constraints being linear in the OPF.
Proposition 6. The TCRDJ ∂PA
∂qA
is symmetric.



















is positive definite (P.D.), M is also P.D. by defini-
tion under the assumption that the rows of HĀb are linearly independent and
that the number of rows is less than the number of generators in the set Ā.
Therefore, we only need to prove V ≤ 0 to prove ∂PA
∂qA
is N.S.D. by its formula
(4.14).
Similar to section 3.1.4 where we proved the TCRDD is less than or
equal to zero, we prove V ≤ 0 by a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) formulation.









The Least Sum of Squares Error (SSE) is





















Therefore, V ≤ 0, and the TCRDJ ∂PA
∂qA
is negative semidefinite.
4.3 Handling binding quantity offers and binding price
offers
Some offer functions may be binding at certain constant output levels,
such as the capacity bounds, and some other offers may be binding at constant
offer prices if they bid constant prices for some output stacks. As discussed in
section 3.4, these special cases need to be handled separately, because (4.12)
will be invalid under those circumstances. If an offer is binding at the output
limit for the market clearing conditions, then the corresponding entry in O′′
Ā
is undefined. If an offer is binding at a constant price, O′′
Ā
is not invertible.
Following section 3.4, to handle these binding offer quantities and bind-
ing offer prices, partition the generators in set Ā into three subsets: the gener-
ators with binding offer quantities, denoted by f; the generators with binding
offer prices, denoted by z; and the generators with offers having non-zero
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+ µTb (Hvbqv + Hfbqf + Hzbqz + HAbqA −HLbqL − Zb)





By definition, at the OPF solution,
∀a ∈ A, ∂qf
∂qa
= 0f. (4.16)




from a sensitivity anal-















O′v (qv)− 1vλ−HTvbµb = 0v,
O′z (qz)− λ1z −HTzbµb = 0z,
Hvbqv + Hzbqz = Zb −HLbqL −HAbqA,
1TĀqĀ = 1
T
L qL − 1TAqA,
(4.17)
where we again view qv, qz, µb, and λ as implicit function of qA, and O
′
z (qz),
0v, 0f , and 0z are similarly defined as in (3.67).

































where O′′v is similarly defined as in (3.68). If the number of binding price offers
in the set z is less than the number of binding transmission constraints, and the
number of binding transmission constraints is less than the number of offers
in set v, then (4.18) has a unique solution. The TCRDJ can be calculated by
solving (4.18).
The symmetry and N.S.D. properties of the TCRDJ still hold with
binding quantity and binding price offers as a result of the implicit function
theorem. Because (4.7)–(4.9) are continuously partially differentiable in the
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can be viewed as a continuous differentiable implicit function of the bidding
slopes of the generators in set z in the vicinity of 0z. If we define a sequence of
positive bidding slopes of the generators in set z, that monotonically approach
0z, then the corresponding TCRDJs, calculated by solving (4.7)–(4.9), in the
sequence are symmetric and N.S.D. as proved in section 4.2. At the limit of the
sequence, (4.7)–(4.9) converge to (4.18). Therefore, the limit of the TCRDJ in
the sequence is the TCRDJ calculated by solving (4.18), and it is symmetric
and N.S.D. as well.
4.4 Maximizing A Generation Firm’s Profit
Similar to maximizing a generator’s profit using TCRDD, we can max-
imize a generation firm’s profit using TCRDJ. In a nodal electricity market,
a generation firm may own multiple generators located at different locations.
Compared with a single generator, a generation firm has more resources to
leverage, and thus may have more profitable strategies.
Similar to optimizing a single generator’s profit based on TCRDD, one
major task is to deal with the non-differentiability in the residual demand
function. In section 3.4, we proposed a special bisection search algorithm to
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find the optimizer for a single generator. However, the algorithm does not
apply to higher dimensional residual demand function. In this chapter, we
propose a bundle method to optimize a generation firm’s bidding strategy in
the residual demand function.
4.4.1 Bundle idea
The bundle concept is widely applied to non-differentiable function op-
timization. To be consistent with the convention of most bundled method




s.t. x ≤ x ≤ x.
(4.19)
where f : Rnx → R is a Lipschitz continuous non-smooth convex function,
where the decision variables are the output levels of the self-owned generators,




(Pa(qa)qa − Ca(qa)) .
The inverse residual demand function PA(qA) may have kinks, which
may make the objective function f non-convex. Let us assume the convexity
of objective function for the current moment to introduce the bundle idea
conveniently. We will cover how to handle non-convex objective function in
section 4.4.2 when we go into the details of the algorithm.
The ∂PA
∂qA
(qA) calculation in section 4.1 provides a subgradient of pA(•).
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The subgradient information (4.20) is crucial for a bundle method.
The bundle concept has two features [37]:
1. Make use at iteration k, the bundle information
(f(xk),g(xk)), (f(xk−1),g(xk−1)), · · · ,
collected so far to build a model of the objective function f .
2. If, due to the kinked structure of f , this model does not characterize f
accurate enough, then mobilize more subgradient information.





{g(xj)T(x− xj) + f(xj)}
= max
1≤j≤k
{g(xj)T(x− xk) + g(xj)T(xk − xj) + f(xj)}
= max
1≤j≤k






f(xj) + g(xj)T(xk − xj)
)
(4.22)
as defined in [37]. If f(•) is convex, fCP(•) is an approximation of f(•) from
below. It is typically a good approximation in the vicinity of xj, because it
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coincides with f at all xj. If enough bundle information has been collected, fCP
may also be a good approximation for f even for x that is far away from xj, but
without enough bundle information, fCP is likely to be a poor approximation
for f , in which case, more bundle information needs to be mobilized to improve
the approximation accuracy.






(qkA)(qA − qkA) + pkA.
P̄A(•; qkA) is an approximation of PA(•) at iteration k, and it coincides with








is another approximation of f(•). In the vicinity of qA, f̄ is a better approxi-
mation than fCP, because f̄ matches both the value and curvature of f .
As f̄ is a good local approximation function, and fCP may be a good
overall approximation given enough bundle information, it will be better to





s.t. x ≤ x ≤ x.
(4.23)
where t ∈ (0, 1] is a parameter to implicitly control the step size. The idea is
to adaptively adjust t in the optimization progress, which resembles the trust
region concept, Although we adjust t instead of the trust region, the effect is
the same. If t is small, the “trust region” is small, and vice versa. If t is chosen
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properly and enough bundle information has been collected, the minimizer of
(4.23) also solves (4.19).





s.t. v ≥ g(xj)T(x− xk)− αk,j + f(xk), ∀j ≤ k,
x ≤ x ≤ x.
(4.24)
We are going to solve (4.24) for xk+1, and depending on whether xk+1
improves f , we will adjust t, add bundle information, and make progress.
Applying the trust region to the bundle concept leads to the following
scheme [37]. If f(xk+1) is “sufficiently smaller” than f(xk), that means (4.24)
is a good approximation to the original problem, so we can make a Serious Step
from the incumbent xk to xk+1, and in the mean time, t could be increased
to enlarge the trust region. If f(xk+1) is not “sufficiently smaller” than f(xk),
that means (4.24) is not a good approximation to the original problem, so we
need to make the approximation more accurate instead of proceed to the next
step. The process is called a Null Step, which does the following: first add
gk+1 = g(xk+1) to the bundle information, then decrease t to shrink the trust
region, and stay with the incumbent xk instead of proceeding to xk+1.
4.4.2 Algorithm
To turn the bundle trust region idea into an algorithm, we needs to
qualify the “sufficiently smaller” criteria and an appropriate stopping criteria.
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These two criteria can be implemented based on the ε-optimal criteria:
if x∗ is the optimizer of f(•), then x is ε-optimal if
f(x) ≤ f(x∗) + ε‖x− x∗‖+ ε. (4.25)
Based on (4.25), we say f(xk+1) is “sufficiently smaller” than f(xk) if:
f(xk+1)− f(xk) < −ε‖xk+1 − xk‖ − ε and ‖xk+1 − xk‖ ≤ 1,
or
f(xk+1)− f(xk) < −ε and ‖xk+1 − xk‖ > 1.
The second condition above means when xk+1 is sufficiently away from xk, it
is likely the bundle information will get improved from the current model if
we proceed to xk+1, so we would like to make a Serious Step even though the
improvement in the objective function is small.
The stopping criteria needs more derivation. Lemma 2.2 in [37] is a
sufficient condition for ε-optimal. Following [37], let us work out the stopping
criteria, that satisfies Lemma 2.2 in [37], from the KKT conditions of (4.24):

















Sum (4.26) over j, apply (4.27) and (4.28), and evaluate at x = xk+1,
∑
j






(xk+1 − xk) + f(xk) (4.30)











(xk+1 − xk) + f(xk) ≤ ε.
(4.31)
The algorithm is as follows.
1. Let k = 0, xk = x0, and tk = 1.
2. Let k = k + 1, and solve (4.24) for xk+1.
3. If stopping criteria (4.31) is satisfied, optimal solution found with x∗ =
xk, stop.
4. If f(xk+1) is “sufficiently smaller” than f(xk), then make a Serious Step:
tk = min{1, 2tk}, compute gk+1 = g(xk+1), and continue with step 2.
Otherwise, tk = 0.5tk, and make a Null Step: compute gk+1 = g(xk+1),
let xk+1 = xk, and continue with step 2.
With minor modifications, the algorithm can handle non-convex func-
tion as well. If the objective function is non-convex, (4.21) may not be an
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generator bus qmin qmax marginal cost
1 1 0 100 0.020q + 40
2 4 0 100 0.020q + 40
3 6 0 100 0.020q + 40
4 8 0 100 0.020q + 40
5 10 0 550 0.044q + 20
30 69 0 805.2 0.039q + 20
Table 4.1: Generator data
approximation of f(•) from below. In this case, αk,j in (4.22) may be nega-
tive. As proved in section 3 of [37], as long as we replace αk,j by
βk,j = max{αk,j, ε0‖xk − xj‖} ≥ 0,
where ε0 is a very small positive number, the algorithm will be able to handle
non-convex objective function. Note that, in this case, the stopping criteria
does not imply ε-optimality, it merely means xk+1 is “almost” stationary as
pointed by in [37].
4.5 Computational Example
We apply the algorithm to the IEEE 118-bus test system, which is also
used in section 3.4. We optimize the profit for a fictitious generation firm
A, who owns two generators: generator 5 located at bus 10 with 550 MW
capacity, and generator 30 located at bus 69 with 805.2 MW capacity. Part
of the generator data is listed in Tab. 4.1. Assume all generators other than
generators 5 and 30 offer at their true marginal cost.
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4.5.1 Firm strategy vs single generator strategy
We plotted the contour of the profit function and the optimization
trajectory in Fig. 4.1, and the data is listed in Tab. 4.2. The “step” column in
Tab. 4.2 indicates a Serious Step by ’S’, a Null Step by ’N’, and optimal solution
by ’O’. The same convention also applies to other similar tables through the
rest of the chapter. After 5 iterations, the algorithm found the optimizer
q∗5 = 356.58 and q
∗
30 = 434.17, with a total profit of 9192.3. At the optimum,
generator 5 is making a profit of 4299.9, and generator 30 is making a profit of
4892.3, as listed in column 2 of Tab. 4.3. The power flow involves the capacity
constraints of branches 36-30, 38-26, and 51-38 binding at 200 MW each.
We also consider the case that generators 5 and generator 30 belong
two different generation firms, respectively, which do not own any other units
in the system. As listed in column 3 of Tab. 4.3, the optimal strategy for
generator 5 is q∗5 = 344.76 with profit π
∗
5 = 4188.88, assuming all other gen-
erators, including generator 30, offer at their marginal costs. As listed in
column 4 of Tab. 4.3, the optimal strategy for generator 30 is q∗30 = 436.44
with profit π∗30 = 4650.6, assuming all other generators, including generator 5,
offer at their marginal costs. The sum of π∗5 and π
∗
30 is 8839.4, which is less
than the generation firm A’s profit 9192.3. The increased profit is achieved
by decreasing q30 by 2.27 MW, which reduces generator 30’s profit, but frees
up some transmission capacity so that generator 5’s output can increase by a
larger amount, 11.82 MW, without overloading the transmission lines. This
demonstrates that a generation firm’s profit maximizing strategy may be sub-
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iter. q5 q30 profit step
0 200.00 200.00 6509.6 S
1 435.27 499.92 8260.2 S
2 313.33 412.58 9069.1 S
3 374.58 445.66 9126.5 S
4 359.47 431.98 9191.6 S
5 356.59 434.17 9192.3 O
Table 4.2: Optimization trajectory starting from (200,200)
Firm A Single Generator
g5 g30 g5 g30
q∗ 356.58 434.17 344.76 436.44
p∗ 39.98 39.68 39.68 39.11
π∗ 4299.9 4892.3 4188.88 4650.6
Table 4.3: Optimization solutions: firm vs single generator
optimal from each single generator’s perspective, but is more profitable than
unilaterally using each generator’s optimal strategy. This makes monitoring
and analyzing a generation firm’s strategic behavior more challenging.
4.5.2 Different starting points
In addition to the starting point q5 = 200 and q30 = 200, we initialized
the algorithm with other starting points to test its robustness. Including the
starting point q5 = 200 and q30 = 200, we will test four different starting
points:
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The optimization trajectories are listed in Tab. 4.2, Tab. 4.4, Tab. 4.5,
and Tab. 4.6 respectively. The algorithm reliably finds the optimizer for each
of the starting point within 4 to 6 iterations with run time less than 2 seconds
each.
The robustness and performance of this approach is superior to the
MPEC approach. As illustrated in [23], the MPEC approach suffers from
the non-convexity due to the complementary constraints. The MPEC cannot
reliably find the optimizer for certain starting points. As a result, one need to
run the MPEC program multiple times in order to safely conclude an optimal
solution. Our algorithm, in contrast, works with the primal variables, and
thus has less difficulties with the non-convexity. Although theoretically it is
possible that the optimization problem is non-convex, as a practical matter,
the problem is typically convex or close to convex, which helps our algorithm
to work robustly.
Another observation is that because the bundle method depends on
history, even if different optimization path intersect at a certain point, their
subsequent trajectories may not be the same. For example, iteration 1 in
Tab. 4.4 coincides with iteration 1 in Tab. 4.5, but after that, the two trajec-
tories are very different. Nevertheless, they approach the same optimizer.
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iter. q5 q30 profit step
0 300.00 500.00 9015.0 S
1 374.59 445.67 9126.4 S
2 355.56 393.19 9131.3 S
3 362.78 434.00 9191.3 S
4 356.60 434.18 9192.3 O
Table 4.4: Optimization trajectory starting from (300, 500)
iter. q5 q30 profit step
0 450.00 250.00 8293.7 S
1 374.59 445.67 9126.4 N
2 374.59 445.67 9126.4 N
3 374.59 445.67 9126.4 S
4 356.64 433.78 9191.9 S
5 356.61 433.98 9192.2 O
Table 4.5: Optimization trajectory starting from (450,250)
iter. q5 q30 profit step
0 450.00 550.00 7694.0 S
1 326.63 399.15 9084.1 S
2 374.59 445.67 9126.4 S
3 355.20 440.33 9191.5 S
4 356.60 434.18 9192.3 O










































































Figure 4.4: Optimization trajectory starting from (450,550)
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4.5.3 Performance Test
We test the performance of the algorithm by increasing the number of
generators owned by generation firm A from 5 generators to 30 generators.
All tests start from competitive output levels. The results are summarized
in Tab. 4.7. All these scenarios finish within 15 seconds on a 2.2GHz Intel
Core 2 Duo PC, with less than 35 total steps including both Serious Steps
and Null Steps. The number of steps also implies the number of OPFs solved,
because there is exactly one OPF solved in each step in order to evaluate the
profit function, and calculate the TCRDJ. For large scale problem, iteratively
solving the OPF is the most computationally intense part for this algorithm, so
improving the OPF solver performance will directly improve the performance
of this algorithm.
The 30 generator scenario has an infeasible OPF due to significant
withholding from generation firm A. In this case, the generation firm A is
pivotal meaning that without generators from generation firm A, the rest of
the generators in the system are not enough to meet the total system demand.
In this case, if there is no price cap in the market, generation firm A will
behave pivotally to withhold till the system is short of supply to drive the
price arbitrarily high. We can observe this phenomena in the 30 generator
scenario in Tab. 4.7. After 20 iterations, the profit has gone above 1010 $/h.
The performance of the algorithm does not directly depend on the
number of generators owned by the generation firm. For example, the 20
generators scenario requires less iterations than the 15 generators scenario.
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generators Serious Steps Null Steps run time profit
1–5 3 9 1.7 s 4.1448× 103
1–10 3 0 0.6 s 5.0231× 103
1–15 5 7 1.8 s 1.0109× 104
1–20 3 0 0.8 s 1.0454× 104
1–25 24 10 11.4 s 5.3263× 105
1–30 9 11 4.4 s 3.8379× 1010 a
aEnergy balance has been violated.
Table 4.7: Performance test
This is because sometimes when the generation firm has more generators to
leverage, some of the generator output levels can be more easily determined
to stay at the capacity bounds, which leaves fewer effective decision variables.
Another observation is that some of the generators have larger impact
on the profit than others. For example, the profit only changes about 1000 $/h
from the 5-generator scenario to the 10-generator scenario, while the profit
changes about 5000 $/h from the 10-generator scenario to the 15-generator
scenario, which implies generator 6 – 10 are not as effective as generator 11 –
15. Similarly, generator 21 - 25 seem to have very large impact on the profit.
The performance of the algorithm is affected more by the number of these
highly effective generators. Generally speaking, more iterations are needed
when highly effective generators are added to the portfolio.
4.6 Conclusion
In electricity markets, especially nodal electricity markets, a generation
firm may own multiple generators located at multiple buses and exposed to
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different LMPs. In this context, we generalize the residual demand concept
from a single generator’s perspective to a generation firm’s perspective. The
TCRDD for a single generator corresponds to a TCRDJ for a generation firm.
We derived the TCRDJ based on a multi-parameter sensitivity analysis of
the OPF. Then we proposed a bundle trust region algorithm to optimize a
generation firm’s profit based on the TCRDJ. The algorithm is applied to the
IEEE 118-bus system to demonstrate the effectiveness of the method. The
TCRDJ provides useful insights about a generation firm’s strategic behavior.
The algorithm provides an effective and promising approach for generation




In the chapter, we summarize the dissertation and discuss future re-
search topics.
5.1 Summary
Through the previous chapters, we have analyzed strategic behavior
in electricity markets from a residual demand perspective. We started with
a SFE stability analysis in chapter 2, which is an application of the residual
demand method in the absence of transmission constraints, aiming at refining
the electricity market supply function Nash equilibria.
Then we devoted major effort to deal with transmission constraints in
chapters 3 and 4. We characterized the residual demand in a transmission-
constrained network from a single generator’s perspective, and then generalized
the concept to a generation firm’s perspective, which may own multiple gener-
ators located at different locations. The core of the residual demand character-
ization is the transmission-constrained residual demand derivative (TCRDD)
and the transmission-constrained residual demand Jacobian (TCRDJ), which
are very useful in characterizing the profit maximizing strategy. We not only
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defined these concepts, but also improved their calculation efficiency and prac-
tical implementation. With those improvements, the TCRDD and TCRDJ
calculation can be implemented as a light-weight OPF post-processing step.
This enables us to decouple the generator or generation firm’s profit maximiza-
tion problem into two subproblems, the lower problem of post-OPF TCRDD
or TCRDJ calculation, and the upper problem of profit maximization based
on TCRDD or TCRDJ. The decoupled structure has the advantage of being
able to reuse advanced OPF solvers, so this method is able to solve large scale
problems.
If the whole residual demand function is given, as discussed in sec-
tion 1.3, the upper problem is very easy to solve. Basically we need to find
a point on the explicitly given residual demand function that maximizes the
profit.
However, we do not have an explicit analytical representation of the
residual demand function, and it is computationally expensive to numerically
evaluate the function using the OPF. Therefore, we proposed methods to use
the TCRDD or TCRDJ to find the optimizer that only require a few evalua-
tions of OPF. In essence, the methods are based on Newton methods, as we
calculate the profit function Hessian matrix using TCRDD or TCRDJ.
Generally, the residual demand function is not continuously differen-
tiable, which results in “kinks” in the profit function. Thus another task is to
deal with these non-differentiable points. We customized the bundle trust re-
gion method by Schramm and Zowe [37] to optimize the kinked profit function
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based on TCRDJ. The idea is to build up a cutting plane approximation to the
objective function from gathered information from previous iterations, that is,
the “bundle.” We rely on the cutting plane approximation to determine the
locations of the objective function kinks.
For a single generator’s profit maximization, because there is only one
decision variable, profit maximization only involves a line search. We devel-
oped a special bisection search algorithm to find the optimizer. Considering
the algorithm in the context of the bundle idea, one can find that the algo-
rithm is building a two-piece quadratic function approximation in the interval
[qlo, qhi], so it is in essence a “quadratic bundle” method. For a scalar problem,
the quadratic bundle problem can be solved very easily because there are at
most three candidates for the optimizer. Therefore, we can use the more accu-
rate quadratic bundle. In contrast, for a generation firm’s profit maximization,
if we also use a quadratic bundle instead of the (linear) cutting plane bundle,
it will introduce quadratic constraints into the optimization problem we solve
in each iteration, and make it more difficult to solve in practice. This is why
we use the cutting plane bundle for a generation firm’s profit maximization
problem.
The contributions of the dissertation can be evaluated by the goals we
discussed in chapter 1:
• from the practical point of view, the method is able to handle large scale
production level systems, and it is better if the existing advanced market
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simulation engines can be reused;
• from the theoretical point of view, the method is able to represent the
transmission network to the same details as in the true market clearing
process, and systematically find the profit maximizing strategy.
To achieve the second goal, we have represented the transmission constraints
in the same way that the market clearing engine models them in deriving
the TCRDD and TCRDJ. To achieve the first goal, we decouple the profit
maximization problem into two easily solvable subproblems. The decoupled
structure makes the computational capability of the method close to the com-
putational capability of existing advanced OPF programs, which can solve
very large scale problems. We have tested the performance of these methods
on the IEEE 118-bus system. Our testing has been limited by the capability
of our OPF solver and available test cases. In the future, we will do further
tests in larger test systems (with thousands of buses, which is close to size of
actual power systems, such as CAISO and ERCOT.) In summary, the residual
demand approach provides a very promising methodology in achieving these
goals.
5.2 Future research
The theory and methods proposed in the dissertation have broken
ground for further research topics. This dissertation directly studies how to
find the profit maximizing strategies for a generator or generation firm. This
128
can help small generation firms to participant in the market, but may also
help oligopolistic generation firms understand how to leverage transmission
constraints to exercise market power. One natural future research topic is
from a market monitor’s perspective how to monitor potential market power
in electricity markets.
The studies in this field have been very ad hoc historically. There are
two major reasons for this. One reason is that the classic market power indices,
such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), do not have a solid connection
with price markups or any other tangible measures unless in a Cournot model.
The other reason is that the transmission constraints have been represented
unrealistically.
In industry, several electricity markets have used capacity-based HHI
or similar measures to monitor market power, which do not have any theoret-
ical justification [41]. Some examples of such measures include the “Element
Competitiveness Index” (ECI) [16] in the proposed ERCOT nodal market and
the “three pivotal supplier test” [31] in the PJM market. The ECI considers
each transmission line in the system separately to determine if there is enough
competition to resolve congestion from the import side and the export side
defined by positive and negative shift factors. Then the HHI is calculated for
the import side and the export side. The representation of the transmission
network model is partial in this measure in that the line-by-line examination
neglects interaction of multiple binding constraints in the system. For example,
a generator with 0.5 shift factor that is considered to be effective in resolving
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congestion in the ECI model may not actually be able to resolve the congestion
if it would then overload another line by doing so. The “three pivotal supplier
test” in the PJM market is very similar to the ECI test except it is doing a
pivotal supplier test instead of calculating the HHI. The effectiveness of these
type of methods is very questionable.
The transmission-constrained residual demand concept can be used to
derive market power indices with solid theoretical foundation. We will give
two examples with the hope of spurring ideas.
Price Markup The price markup is defined as the difference between
the strategic price and the competitive price. By (2.2), at the profit maximiz-
ing point,
p− C ′i (qi) = −P ′i (qi)qi. (5.1)
Note that the left hand side of (5.1) is the difference between the profit maxi-
mizing price and the corresponding marginal cost. This property can be used
to measure potential price markup for a generator assuming the competitive
price is higher than the marginal cost. The potential price markup character-
izes how large the incentive is for a generator to drive up the price above the
competitive level in the process of pursuing maximum profit. Similarly for a
generation firm A:




so the same logic could be applied to a generation firm.
Profit Markup The profit markup is defined as the difference between
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the profit by bidding strategically and the competitive profit. At the profit
maximizing point,
qi (p− C ′i (qi)) = −P ′i (qi)q2i . (5.3)
Note that the left hand side of (5.3) is the output quantity multiplied by
the price markup above the marginal cost, which can be used to measure the
potential profit markup in the process of pursuing maximum profit. Similarly
for a generation firm A:




so the same logic could be applied to a generation firm as well.
The two examples above are both sensitivity based measures. They can
be calculated with one run of the market clearing process. Similar measures
can be calculated using simulation based methods. With simulation, one can
clear the market with true cost, then clear the market with the offers and
bids, and compare the differences in prices and profits. The appropriateness
of sensitivity based measures versus simulation based measures depends on
the application. The simulation based methods are more suitable for offline
studies to determine overall market performance over time, say a month. The
sensitivity based indices above are more suitable for online operations to as-
sist market power identification and mitigation. We will continue working on
using the transmission-constrained residual demand concept to define market
power indices in assessing electricity market competitiveness, and design online
market power mitigation mechanisms.
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It is my hope to see real applications of the residual demand based





Ordinary Least Squares Problem and
Weighted Least Squares Problem
The formulation and results in this section are from [22]. An Ordinary
least squares (OLS) problem is formulated as follows. Suppose there are n
observations (Yi,Xi) , ∀i = 1, . . . , n. The objective is to find an optimal

























Y1 Y2 . . . Yn
]T
,
assuming there is no multicollinearity, i.e. X has linearly independent columns.





















Define another projection matrix M by:
MX = I−PX.
Both matrices PX and MX are idempotent, namely:
P2X = PX,
M2X = MX.










Suppose we want to add one regressor to the problem. Now there are
n observations (Yi,Xi, zi) , ∀i = 1, . . . , n, with zi added. Again assume there
is no multicollinearity with zi added.













































SSEOLS (β, γ) < min
β
SSEOLS (β) .
If we put weights on different observations, then it is a weighted least

















where the weight matrix is defined by:
W =

W1 0 . . . 0





0 0 . . . Wn
 .
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The minimal SSE is:





Let us assume W is positive semi-definite so that W1/2 exists:
W1/2W1/2 = W.








1 0 . . . 0
0 w
1/2
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